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The purpose of this research is to examine civil-military relations in the Soviet
Union up until the events that led to the August 1991 coup d'etat. Using a historical
backdrop and existing case studies, it was illustrated that the military and political
leadership's had both conflict and consensus in their relationship. In an attempt to revive
the stagnating Soviet economy, Gorbachev launched a radical reform of the military
under the guise of glasnost, perestroika, and "new thinking". These changes had a
significant impact on the civil-military relationship. Considerable access to the defense
decision-making process was provided for a number of civilian institutions reducing the
military's autonomy in military affairs. Glasnost provided the impetus for scrutiny and
criticism of previous military policies demoralizing military leadership. Splits in the
officer corps resulted from the enhanced political participation supported by Gorbachev.
Lower and middle ranking officer in favor of radical reforms became disillusioned with
the conservatism of the High Command. The degree of conflict rose between the military
and Gorbachev as concessions on a host of arms control agreements, the collapse of
Communist power in Eastern Europe, and the deteriorating situation between the central
government and the republics left the military in a state of flux. Gorbachev's persistence
toward further reform lead to the demise of the Communist Party and the ideology to
which the military had been bound to serve. With no economic return in sight and an
impending Union Treaty that would divulge a great deal of military decision-making to
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I. INTRODUCTION
President Mikhail Gorbachev unleased a radical restructuring of civil-
military relations. "New Thinking" and democratization fundamentally changed
the military's role in Soviet politics. These changes have enhanced civilian
participation into what was once considered the military's turf and continues to
erode the military's position in society. Civil-military relations reached
unmistakable tension and conflict during the latter part of Gorbachev's six years
in power. Ultimately this conflict came to a head in August 1991 as a coup d'etat
attempted by conservative forces and supported by members of the High
Command ended in failure. An investigation into the relationship between
Gorbachev, the Party, and the military prior to the putsch is imperative. The
implications for future U. S. and "Soviet" relations and global stability will be
strongly influenced by the new civil-military balance achieved by the republics.
The Soviets have not established a clear cut organization to assert civilian
control over the military. Communist Party control was based to a large degree
on ideology. It was thought that military leaders had accepted party hegemony
and had no higher political aspirations. A theme often asserted was that "the
military was an inalienable part of the people and that its development has never
been, and will never be, something set apart or isolated from other spheres of
party and state activity." 1 Timothy Colton explained three modes which
established party control over the military. The first implied that party leadership
was hierarchically superior to the military and it alone "directed and coordinated
the activity of all state and public organs for the strengthening of the country's
defense capability."2 The second mode of control was from within the military.
Party and Komsomol membership of nearly all military personnel embodied the
spirit of the party and conveyed its priorities and decisions. A third control
mechanism was achieved by a vast, convoluted, structure of political organs,
namely the Main Political Administration (MPA). This organization occupied the
position on the military-political boundary and exerted party influence on every
aspect of the life and activity of the forces.3 The relationship between the Party
and military was dynamic. It was shaped by important systemic, structural, and
ideological limits, such as the hegemonic power of a single party, the absence of
a constitutional means of transferring power, security, ...and the Marxist-Leninist
tradition that views standing armies as anti-revolutionary forces and threats to
party hegemony.4
1 Colton, T.J., Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority, Harvard





4 Kolkowicz, R., " The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Socialist Countries:
The Soviet Union", cited in Perlmutter, A., Modern Authoritarianism, Yale
University Press, 1981, p. 53.
The Defense Council was one of the most important means of Party control
over the military. Throughout the history of the Soviet Union the Council had
several predecessors, but its function remained the same. It served as the central
locus of interaction between the political and military leadership for the resolution
of defense-related issues. It was a political body and often adjusted to the
changing political realities. The Council was a direct means to convey the
political leadership's demands and often reflected a leader's shifting sensitivities.
A number of paradigms have been developed to characterize civil-military
relations in the Soviet Union. While several models exist, three distinct theories
dominate the literature. The first, described by Roman Kolkowicz, maintains that
the relationship between the military and the Communist Party has been
subjected to continuous conflict. The military has struggled to obtain its
professional autonomy while the Party infiltrates and undermines its efficiency.
The history of party-military relations presents a study in conflicts created by a
certain incompatibility between the sole holder of power in the state and one of
the main instruments of that power. 5 Kolkowicz also argues that the degree of
military professionalism, or autonomy, is directly proportional to the increasing
levels of technology in warfare. As the Communist Party allowed greater
autonomy, the military established itself as an interest group that sought to
challenge civilian controls for a greater role in society.
' Kolkowicz, R., The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Westview Press,
1985, p. 11.
William Odom describes a completely opposite scenario. He maintains that
the military was born of the party and that the two are not in conflict with each
other but maintain a symbiotic relationship. Differences of opinion do crop up
from time to time but "against a background of broad pragmatic consensus."6
For Odom, cooperation is the hallmark of the relationship. He states that military
professionalism does not generate politically significant attitudes. Soviet Marshals
and Generals should be thought of bureaucratic executants of the will of the party
bosses with whom they basically agree rather than as defenders of a corporate
cause or would-be praetorians. 7 The sum total of the interaction, despite small
differences, is for the betterment of the Soviet Union.
Timothy Colton challenges the previous two models. Instead, he maintains
the relationship is coalitional; that the party maintains its dominance, but that the
military is rarely politically quiescent. This thesis proposes something in between
that of Kolkowicz and Odom. He states that while conflict and congruence has
been a factor at various stages in the relationship, an intricate balance between the
two and the efficiency of the party apparatus denies the military complete control.
It stresses that the interaction between military and civilian elites, in which neither
side attains absolute domination, but the party's sovereign power is accepted. 8
6 Colton, T. J. and Gustafson, T. eds., Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military





Soviet defense policies are the outcomes of extended bargaining and political
maneuvering among a variety of interested institutions.9 Colton's "participatory
model" has several benefits over those of Odom and Kolkowicz. The latter
presumes that the Party and the military form dichotomous categories. This
constrains the extent to which military officers and civilians actually take part in
politics. Colton's model also leaves room for internal differentiation on both sides
of the civil-military boundary and for the existence of cross-institutional
connections and alliances. 10 It provides analytical flexibility and allows more
than one level of complexity.
Colton appears to have projected the most accurate description of the
relationship. Using Colton's model and the benefit of hindsight, civil-military
relationships will be reviewed. In its outset, a historical overview of the
relationship starting at the end of the nineteenth century will be evaluated. It is
during this period that a formative military ethos was generated. Much of the
civil-military debate centered on the role of the military. Civilian institutions
pressed their own ideas as to the function of the military bringing them into
conflict with the military.
Colton, T., Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority, pp. 4-5.
10 Colton, T. J., "The Party-Military Connection: a Participatory Model", in
Herspring, D.R. and Volgyes, I., Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems,
Westview, 1978, p. 63.
As revolution and civil war swept through the country former Czarist
officers were incorporated into the Red Army to bolster its organization and
prevent the premature collapse of the state. The Communists had little trust of
the military and the power it possessed. Institutions were established that would
control and monitor commanders ensuring their allegiance and education met
with Party approval.
Stalin dominated the civil-military relationship. The High Command had
little choice but to heed the wisdom and decisions of Stalin. However, resistance
at lower levels of command and control were evident during the war. A great
deal of consensus was formed between the political organs and Red commanders
as the demands of war effort took priority. The majority of the conflict was not
among the latter but between the fronts and the central government and their
management of the war effort. There were periods during Stalin's tenure that
accommodated the interests of the military. Accolades such as rank, insignia, and
permanent prestige were bestowed upon the military. However, the freedom to
debate military art and strategy were highly censored restricting the military's
autonomy until his death.
The military's ethos was revitalized under Khrushchev as officers began to
voice their opinions with little fear of retribution. He relied to a large extent on
the military to secure the top leadership position. However, once his position
was firmly established, Khrushchev moved to put his own personal impression
on the military organization. His emphasis on strategic rockets lead to extensive
reductions in the ground, air and naval forces. Ironically, Khrushchev ventured
into a foreign policy which depended on enhanced military power. His
"harebrained schemes" brought resentment from the military and the Party,
eventually leading to his ouster.
The "golden age" of the military was under the direction of Brezhnev. The
vast military build up, and Brezhnev's determination to confront United States
military power, provided the military greater access to the political process.
Detente brought equal status to the Soviet Union in the international arena.
However, the rate of economic growth fell below that of military spending
necessitating a change in Brezhnev's attitude. Constraints on military spending
were imposed and party dominance over the military increased.
The trend set by Brezhnev continued through the brief leadership periods
of Andropov and Chernenko. However, the calls for belt-tightening did not
suppress the military's advocacy for further investment and criticism of the U.S.
military build-up. Marshal Ogarkov lead the outspoken resistance to civilian
supremacy. His removal in 1984 was a tremendous blow to the military's
political status. The move was a signal of the divergence in attitudes towards
defense decision making.
Mikhail Gorbachev grossly changed the institutional structure of politics and
power in the Soviet Union. The economic stagnation created by the high levels
of defense spending, corruption, and mismanagement demanded reform. Many
officers welcomed the restructuring as a means to keep pace with increasingly
high levels of technology being incorporated into modern weapons. However, the
technological reward never materialized as the timid economic reforms supported
by Gorbachev did not succeed during the first five years he was in power.
The military had its political position attacked from all sides of Soviet polity
creating conflict between civilian and military leaders. Gorbachev, a master
political tactician, removed obstacles to the reform process by forming a coalition
of supporters around him and eliminating those who opposed him. Within the
military, an unprecedented number of personnel changes were implemented.
During the first four years of Gorbachev's tenure forty-six new appointments
have occurred at the top level regional command. 11
Lead by Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze, and Party Secretary
Alexandr Yakovlev, civilian attacks on the military ensued. The signing of the
INF treaty, unilateral force reductions, and withdrawal from Eastern Europe attest
to the success of civilian political dominance. Gorbachev has widened the
participation in the defense decision making process. The establishment of
greater presidential powers relegated the politburo to party affairs leaving the
party with little input to national policy. The Defense Council, Main Military
Council and the Joint Committee on International Affairs and on Defense and
State Security of the Supreme Soviet have overtaken military dominance in
defense decision making process. The once hallow ground of the General Staff
11 Zamascikov, S., Changes in the Soviet Military Leadership Since 1987, RAND
Corporation N-3188-USDP, December 1990, p. 1.
*
8
has become fair game for heated debate as to the future structure and
organization of the armed forces.
Glasnost has severely impacted the military. Widened public scrutiny on a
host of military issues has allowed the military to become a political scapegoat for
Gorbachev's lack of economic success. Ironically, even though Gorbachev has
down played the role of the military in international affairs, widespread
republican nationalism and violence required a greater dependance on the
military to maintain internal control. Much to the dislike of military personnel,
the army was called upon to mediate violent clashes between the republics. The
Tbilisi incident severely effected the public image of the military. It involved a
brutal repression of a public demonstration in Tbilisi which resulted in the deaths
of 19 people. The operation was directed by the military. Desertions and draft
dodging are being advocated by republican governments. Ethnic violence
threatens to split the military from within.
The institutional changes implemented by Gorbachev have fundamentally
altered Soviet military politics. The abandonment of the Communist Party and
enhanced civilian access to military affairs placed the leadership of the high
Command in a dark corner. Amos Perlmutter stated that the recipe for military
intervention into politics:
"...officers are likely to take political action when the integrity of their
professionalism is weakened. This integrity weakens as a result of the
decline of the military status of officers, military defeat, and the rise of
radical movements." 12
With this criteria met, several leaders of the Soviet High Command collaborated
with Communist hard liners in an attempt to oust Gorbachev from power and
reestablish the old order. The failed coup resulted in a modern day revolution
speeding up the reform process and ushering in a new phase of civil-military
relations.
12 Perlmutter, A., The Military and Politics in Modern Times, Yale University
Press, 1977, pp. 34-35.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
A. THE MILITARY AND THE TSARS
The pre-revolutionary armies of the Tsars was dominated by the nobility.
Military professionalism was curtailed as the Tsars refused to differentiate
between the military and civilian administration. Russia was a highly militaristic
state as its government relied on the military to solve both foreign and domestic
conflicts. Many officers were thought of as general purpose agents and
participated a great deal in both civil and military affairs. This could be
explained by the Tsars zeal for the military way of life and partly because the
military academies out-produced their civilian counterparts in education. The
cumulative effect produced a broad consensus of opinion with respect to civil-
military relations. Any conflict between the military and the government was
nominally due to a specific grievances by individuals against the regime and
generally not representative of the entire military. 13
The military reforms enacted by War Minister D. A. Miliutin in 1874
significantly changed the attitudes of military leaders. Professionalism began to
develop among the military as it sought to promote its sphere of influence and
expertise in military affairs. As William Fuller states: "there was a constant
13 Keep, J. L., Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia, 1462-1874,
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985, Chaps. 10-11.
11
diffusion of professional ideas and attitudes among a growing segment of the
military elite." 14 Towards the end of the 1890's, demonstrations and riots by
peasants and intelligentsia against the Tsars authority produced tension in civil-
military relations. During the 1905-1907 revolution the regime dispatched troops
to not only suppress disorder but to deter them. Also at issue was the Minister
of War's indifference to the eroding military budget and increased internal role.
The greatest source of debate however, concerned the role and function of the
military. Compartmentalization of state agencies pitted civilian ministries (i.e.
Department of Justice), the autocracy, and the military against each other. Each
interest group had its own perspective as to the best uses for the army. These
missions ranged from guard duty at the growing numbers of prisons, to policing
the rebelling districts along the periphery of the empire. The military leadership
had only one mission in mind and that was the preparation and training for war.
Fuller states that Imperial Russian military professionalism and civil-military
conflict fueled each other. The more professionalism exhibited by the military,
the more vigorously it pushed for the modernization of the military arsenal and
the creation of a truly national, patriotic military. The more civilian ministries
frustrated these goals, the more firmly officers adhered to their program. Russian
military politics was interest group politics. 15 The military elite appreciated
14
Fuller, W., Civil-Military Conflict in Imperial Russia, 1881-1914, Princeton




politics less for what it meant for the country and more for the possible benefits
it accrued to Russia's military potential.
"Russian military professionalism was essentially inward-looking, insular,
and concerned with the general problem of governance only insofar as it
directly impinged upon the army. For professional officers the army became
an end to itself, the preservation of the army a goal more important than the
survival of the Romanov dynasty or the Empire." 16
There were no attempts at military intervention during the later half of the
nineteenth century. However, in what could be construed as a coup d'etat, was
the military's involvement in the abdication of Nicholas II in March 1917. It is
thought he abdicated his throne at the recommendation of a considerable number
of front line commanders. Their encouragement was a result of the
mismanagement of the war effort.
Civil-military relations had a adverse impact on the combat readiness of the
armed forces towards the end of Imperial Russia. The War Minister's
intransigence over issues such as living conditions, morale and recognition of
military professionalism produced a military that had atrophied. His
concentration on trivial details and bickering with the civilian leadership did not
serve the military's interests but detracted from them. The military's diversion
to other sources of conflict within a crumbling regime led to serious fractures in




B. REVOLUTION, CIVIL WAR, AND PEACE
This period represents the most important stage in civil-military relations.
It was during the revolution and subsequent civil war that the structure,
organization, and domestic role of the Soviet military was determined. Lenin and
his followers made few plans for the structure and use of the military. According
to Marxist theory, there was no need for a standing army in an advanced socialist
state. The gains of the revolution would be protected by arming the proletariat.
As early as 1905, Lenin indicated his revulsion to large standing armies:
"In every State everywhere, a standing army serves as a tool against the
internal enemy rather than against an external one. Everywhere it turns into
a tool of reaction...We must destroy this evil and eliminate the standing
army completely. People in arms must absorb the army into itself; the
soldier must bring their military competence along with them to the
people." 17
The Bolsheviks had considerable uncertainty as to the role the military
would play in their quest for power. This changed following the crisis of 1905,
as soldiers and sailors became valuable allies for the overthrow of the
government. They formed powerful groups aimed at reducing the power of the
officer corps and promoting better social conditions. Thousands of men mutinied
or deserted in their quest for full civil and political rights. In order to exploit
these movements, early civil-military relations consisted of an intense campaign
by the Bolshevik's to undermine, and disband the armies associated with the
17 Avidar, Y., The Party and the Army in the Soviet Union, Magnus Press, 1983,
p. 9.
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provisional government. By late 1916, party departments and combat
detachments had been established in the army and navy to win the support of
soldiers and sailors. 18
The reasons for Lenin's reliance on the military were self-evident and
measures to appease them of primary importance. His first decrees issued on 8
November 1917, the Decree on Peace and the Decree on Land, were concessions to
the soldiers demands that had aligned them with Bolshevik power. The former
was an appeal to workers and peasants of all of the warring factions to cease the
bloody war and the later gave peasants land ownership. On the same day capital
punishment was also abolished by the Second Congress of Soviets. 19 The
objectives of Lenin were clear: end the war as soon as possible and send the
soldiers home to promote a new social order.
The cumulative effects of the massive demobilization and dissent within the
military allowed the German advance to continue unabated. Lenin quickly
realized that while other nations still possessed standing armies, he would need
one as well. Despite the objections of many soldiers, the People's Council of
Commissars issued a decree establishing the Worker's Peasant Red Army on
January 15, 1918. It was intended to be a voluntary force of organized elements
18 Von Hagen, M., Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: The Red Army and the




of the toiling masses possessed of revolutionary consciousness.20 The decree did
not provide sufficient manpower, however, as only approximately 200,000 men
were recruited. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, provided the necessary
pause in the war with Germany for an intense debate on the reorganization of the
military.
The debate centered on the Commissar for War Leon Trotsky and Joseph
Stalin. At issue was the organization and role of the military. Trotsky
maintained it should evolve in two phases. The first phase would form a
professional army with mandatory service. Other characteristics included: rigid
discipline, ranks and training; orthodox strategy, free from ideology, and be
highly centralized. The justification for the first phase was the urgent need to
defend the country from outside aggression. A second phase would begin with
the conclusion of hostilities and form a truly "revolutionary army". It would
become a decentralized, voluntary military, formed on a territorial basis. It would
equalize all rank, and remove strict training, discipline and utilized revolutionary
military strategy. Trotsky maintained the support of Lenin but his proposals
generated widespread dissatisfaction among the military and in particular with
supporters of Stalin. Stalin, even though he approved of a highly centralize army,




army. The resultant structure of the Red Army was a compromise between the
two phases. The Eighth Party Congress delineated the following structure:
The Red Army would have a definite class character. It was formed as a
highly centralized, regular standing army supported by conscription. It
included the use of "Military Specialists"21controlled by an enhanced system
of political commissars supported by the secret police22
1. The Dilemmas of Demobilization
Civil-military debate continued into the 1920's. As the regime ran into
economic difficulties, the anti-military factions greatly influenced the
recommendations of Trotsky. Trotsky shared the opinion of many civilian leaders
that the army was already the beneficiary of considerable attention and resources
during the Civil War and in light of the economic troubles, the military would
have to do with less. The defeat of the White Army forces in November 1920
opened a new era for the military. The Red Army numbered approximately five
million men by 1920 and was becoming an increasing burden on the economy.
A Central Committee commission was organized for the discussion of
demobilization and subsequently recommended the forces be cut in half. The
Defense and Labor Council (STO) hoped to have half the soldiers back for the
spring sowing in 1921. 23 The Eighth Congress of Soviets which met in December
These were senior officers from the Imperial Army. They were
incorporated into the Red Army for their expertise in military tactics and strategy.
22 Kolkowicz, R., The Soviet Military and The Communist Party, pp. 40-41.
23 Von Hagen, M., p. 126.
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1920 reemphasized the need for freeing the public from the crippling expense of
maintaining the large Civil War Army. The Congress committed the republic to
the creation of a militia and large force reductions. Its disregard of what to do
with the existing Red Army was reflected in the management of the reduction
which served to angered military leaders. Transportation failures spread chaos,
disease and created manpower shortages. The loss of the military's privileged
position in society no longer made it immune from the economic crisis that was
effecting society. Poor living conditions promoted mass defections and desertion
rates. Commissars and Commanders coalesced together to fend off attacks from
society. "Even considering our devastation, our poverty, the shortages of
everything", charged a bitter official in PUR (Political administration of the
Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic) "still it must be said that in this
case the Red Army soldier was not shown the attention he deserved."24
The focus of the civilian attack was not directly on the Army, but on the
Political Administration, which symbolized a distinctive party "style" that a large
sector of the civilian organization had come to loath.25 A set of common
attitudes and approaches within the military were forged on the basis of similar
experiences in the recent war. For a large group of commanders, commissars,






regime and with the revolution. They were accustomed to an army with political
controls from the Communist Party and to practices that gave more power to the
soldiers to intervene in army politics than had been characteristic of the tsarist
army....26
Much to the disgust of military leaders as well as high party members,
Trotsky's major effort to alter the deplorable conditions in the military were based
on what he called his "emphasis on lifestyle". Trotsky alienated the military with
his numerous concessions on military reform. He felt that the problems the
military was facing were only a ramification of the backwardness of the Russian
society as a whole. "Change could only be implemented through teaching citizens
to work accurately, punctually, and economically and soldiers to read and write,
use manuals and maps, and to cultivate habits of tidiness, punctuality and
thrift."
27 He warned that transformation could not be achieved by some
miraculous means such as a specially invented proletarian military doctrine
supported by Red commanders and commissars. Many of Trotsky's enemies took
this as a statement that reflected a violation of party ethics and ideological heresy.
Political leaders within the military felt offended by Trotsky's statements and
accused him of abandoning the revolution. Consequently, in late March 1921,






in the Central Committee formed a commission to review the nation's defense
preparedness.28 They found that the Red Army command had no mobilization
plan for war and failed even to make an inventory of the resources available in
the preparation of such a plan. Lenin's death on January 24, 1924 signalled a
sharp turn for the fate of the army. With Lenin's hesitating but constant support
now gone, Trotsky no longer made an effort to halt the army's takeover by his
opponents. Another investigation was conducted by one of Trotsky's most ardent
foes, the former head of PUR Sergei Gusev one week after Lenin's death. When
the results were compiled, Trotsky's ouster seemed inevitable. By the time the
Central Committee formally relieved Trotsky of his duties, in January 1925,
Mikhail Frunze already had been administering the army for nearly a year. A
new era was beginning in the Red Army.
C. STALIN AND THE MILITARY
1. Military Reform
Frunze worked in close communication with the Central Committee as
military reforms were initiated in 1923. The most significant reform under taken
was the transition to a mixed system of a regular cadre army and a territorial
militia. Much of the civil-military debate had centered on this issue since the
army's inception. Despite objection and complaints by the Military Opposition




In exchange for its agreeing to the new structure, military leaders acquired
several concessions. The first dealt with command of the territorial units.
Initially the units were subordinate to the Vsevobuch (Universal Military Training
Administration) under the direction of Nikolai Podvoiskii. Podvoiskii was not
liked by the military for his views against the establishment of a standing army.
The Vsevobuch was a source of aggravation for the military due to the inherent
problems of an organization not under direct military control involved in
conducting military training. A major victory was achieved for the proponents
of a regular army as command of the territorial units was transferred to the Army
Commissariat and moved to a position subordinate to the army's administrative
and supply system.29 The Vsevobuch could no longer compete with the military
and was completely dismantled. Other concessions included a mandate that
training of the militia be achieved by regular soldiers and officers, and the
imperative that militia units be located away from foreign boarders. Furthermore,
the party made a solemn promise to expand its role in the pre-induction training
once held by the now extinct Vsevobuch.30
Another reform seen as crucial to the rehabilitation of the officer corps was
the elimination of the dual command system. This system required commissars
to sign any orders drafted by Red commanders before soldiers and sailors were




obliged to obey them. In addition, it also provided the impetus for commissars
to engage in operational matters of command which often lead to confusion and
conflicting orders. An intense debate over the future of the political structures of
the military ensued. Many political officers insisted that it was too soon for the
transition to a one-man command system as not enough reliable officers had the
necessary political education. In 1925, a new regulation demoted the commissars
status. The regulation authorized commissars to conduct day to day party and
political work, but conspicuously missing was any reference to monitoring officers
conduct. 31 Other reforms included an increase in pay, improved living standards
for officers, and the "militarization" of the political staff. Militarization was a
program whereby military education was afforded to the political officers that
were being phased out of the command hierarchy and aspired to command.
2. Stalin's Balancing Act
Stalin had a profound effect on civil-military relations. He used a
"balancing act" with respect to the military's demands. 32 This tactic allowed
some military professionalism (greater command authority, social and economic
privileges) to occur, but was offset by imposing stricter political controls. Soon
after removing opponents to his unquestioned authority, Stalin initiated his
"revolution from above". The plan sought to rapidly industrialize and collectivize
31
Ibid, p. 218.
32 Kolkowicz, R., The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, p.49.
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agriculture much to the military's benefit. The inauguration of the first five year
plan in 1928 was a major event for the military as the drive to implement a
massive technical-industrial base was set in motion. Professionalism was
enhanced by the construction of several military academies. Between 1934 and
1935 the last of the territorial militia were eliminated, and the standing army
raised from 562,000 thousand to 1.3 million men.33 Rank and insignia were
reintroduced. The role of the army was refined, as military combat training was
initiated at all levels. In 1935, the General Staff was instituted providing a forum
for the discussion of military science and doctrine.
While Stalin made concessions to the military, he still had little trust of
them. The Military Council was introduced in May 1937. As a form of collective
leadership these were set up in various military districts and composed of the
district commander, the head of the Political Administration, and the secret police.
This measure demoralized military commanders who no longer were free to make








One of the most subjective controls35 were the purges. The purges of
1937-38 decapitated the military. The grounds for being purged were completely
arbitrary. All ranks within the military subjected to its terror as some estimates
indicate sixty percent of the officer corps was liquidated. It caused a severe brain-
drain leaving the military debilitated with little combat effectiveness. Political
officers were not immune from the purges. As Colton describes:
"The purge was a bludgeoning, not a surgical operation... Far from being a
measured action by the party's organs in the army in the name of the party
and its values, the purge was a crude assault upon the party apparatus as
well as upon the army command itself."36
As the invasion of Poland and war with Finland began, the performance of the
military revealed the extent to which the purges had decimated the army. In a
four month campaign against Finland, whose army totalled 200,000 men, the
Soviets employed 1.5 million men and suffered 200,000 casualties, 68,000 of which
were dead.37
35 Samuel Huntington coined the phrase "subjective controls" which meant
maximizing the power of civilian groups vis-a-vis the military leadership by
patronage, surveillance, class-or kinship based recruitment, or some other
intrusive device. Huntington, S. P., The Soldier and the State:The Theory and Politics
of Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University Press, 1957, Chaps. 1-4.




4. World War II Decision Making
The German attack in 1941 came as a surprise to Stalin despite many
warnings issued by the military. Several reasons why he did not heed the
warning signs of the impending conflict have been proposed. Stalin was
extremely wary of Hitler and did not want to upset the delicate Nazi-Soviet pact
he worked so hard to obtain. Any troop movements or harassment of German
aircraft overflights were seen as destabilizing. Stalin also had little trust of his
military informants and may have believed that the German maneuvers were an
attempt to disguise their true intentions. Despite Stalin's gross miscalculation, the
military had to deal with the consequences of his decisions and did so at several
different levels of command.
The central military leadership had no choice but to support the decisions
of Stalin. There were many criticisms by front line commanders that the High
Command was not heeding their advice concerning the German maneuvers. The
intelligence the High Command was in many cases disregarded. The General
Staff viewed Stalin's decisions as competent and sound. They even went so far as
to order troops to keep their distance from the front and prevented air and
ground interference of German overflights as late as the morning of June 22.38
The military party organs were also supportive of the decision to exercise




there would be no war and that talk about the prospect was provoking in itself.
There were those in the High Command that were disturbed by the discrepancy
between public propaganda and their own perceptions and responsibilities and
attempted to change or circumvent official policy. The Chiefs of the Army and
Navy Main Political Administration (MPA) objected to what they perceived as
pacifist tones and the complacent character of official attitudes.39
At the field command level, the incentives for taking action against central
policy were greater as they viewed the impending attack as inevitable. Minor
troop movements as well as some equipment staging was achieved before the
attack. Many political officers were equally supportive of a more forward looking
approach than that advocated by the center. Political officers attempted to
promote greater combat readiness by lecturing on the danger signals reflected by
the German army's posture and the threat of Nazi aggression. Some passed
information to superiors about German movements while still others directly
collaborated with commanders in conducting of permitting precautionary
measures such as readying equipment or repositioning front line officers and
troops.
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The poor performance of the military was staggering. In less than three





41 Kolkowicz, R., The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, p. 65.
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the bungled operation. Assuming direct responsibility for strategic leadership he
immediately promoted himself as the Supreme Commander-in-chief, People's
Commissar of Defense, and chairman of both the State Defense Committee and
of the Supreme Military Headquarters of Stavka.42 He also remained General
Secretary of the Party but no party congresses were held during the war years.
Initially all decisions concerning military operations were made unilaterally by
Stalin and communicated through the Stavka. He often belittled the General
Staff's role by communicating directly with front commanders. As the war effort
continued, officers of the General Staff came to acquire greater authority with
Stalin. They were often responsible for collecting battlefield information
providing maps from which Stalin planned his operations, and whose reports
were normally the basis on which the orders of the day were formulated.43
Stalin began to seek the expertise of his deputies in the decision making process.
The postwar fates of some of the members of the Stavka should not obscure
Stalin's evident admiration and affection for many of them during the war
particularly the Chiefs of General Staff - Zhukov, Boris Shaposhnikov, and
Aleksandr Vasilevski.44






Much of the consensus of opinion between the members of the Stavka and
Stalin did not exist between the lower levels of command and the Stavka. As
Colton explains,
"once the fray was joined, opinions about decisions coalesced across
institutional boarders. The main line of cleavage in the fierce bureaucratic
politics of the war were dictated by hierarchy and territory not by the
boundary between army and party, or between military command and the
MPA."45
The most salient cleavage was between the center and the periphery
demonstrated by the workings of the military leadership and the behavior of the
Stavka Commander Zhukov and the Stavka Commissar Mekhlis. Zhukov was
Stalin's most trusted advisor. He had gained the support of both the High
Command and the political administration for his command of the war effort.
However, his critics outnumbered his supporters. It has been said that he was
given to "sharp expressions and high notes" and "did not choose courteous words"
in his demands and orders.46 He often disregarded the opinions and
recommendations of his subordinates as there were numerous accounts of how
Zhukov insulted and intimidated front line officers.47 It has been asserted by
some Western analysts that he singled out political officers as a means to release
the political controls over the military's autonomy. However, his tough treatment








no occasion when Zhukov singled out a commissar for abuse. ..if at times he saw
party workers as adversaries, it was along with commanders, never apart from
them.48
Lev Mekhlis's role in the Stavka was preceded by his performance as
overseer of the Great Purge of 1937-38. He treated everyone he came into contact
with contempt. His high-handedness dominated the Military Council as he
"interfered with literally every operational matter".49 Consensus on his
relationship with commanders is split. In a characteristic description of the
relationship between most political officers and commanders, he was often
praised for his distinguished role in logistics. His position in the Stavka, before
being dismissed for the losses at the Crimean Front, brought exceptional clout and
facilitated the acquisition of scarce war supplies. Mekhlis was disliked by both
commanders and political officers for his aloofness towards military affairs.
Given his low opinion of political officers other than himself, it is no wonder that
on the Crimean Front the commissars of a tank brigade and tank repair unit were
scornful of Mekhlis's ineptitude as any other officers were; nor is it surprising
that Khrushchev thought he was a nitwit. 50 Despite his role in the Great Purge,









5. Stalin's Post-War Policy
Stalin's post-war relationship with the military was quickly revealed
with the end of hostilities. The climate of the Soviet Union had been demoralized
by the war. Stalin immediately assumed credit for the victorious war effort and
reasserted increased controls over the military. He attributed the victory not to
just the heroism of the Red Army but to his policies of industrialization and
collectivization. Zhukov was removed from his position as Commander of the
Soviet occupation zone and move to the Odessa military district. An
organizational shake up created a more centralized defense structure combining
the National Commissariat of Defense and the National Commissariat of the Navy
into a single Ministry of Defense. A political General N. A. Bulganin was named
as Defense Minister in 1947 and given the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Improvement to the military's political stature came about in 1948 with the
death of Zhdanov. Zhdanov ranked third in the leadership behind Stalin and was
a stout party ideologue. His attempts to thwart party controls through the MPA
were overcome the political administrations of the army and navy were separated
thereby weakening their influence. Marshal Vasilevski replaced Bulganin as
Defense Minister and Zhukov began to reassert himself. In 1952, the Nineteenth
Party Congress allowed notable access of military professionals to the Central
Committee as full members. Marshal Zhukov was also named as a candidate
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member to the committee. 51 It was at this time that the rise of the "Stalingrad
group" became evident. 52 It was this group, bounded together by their war
experience, that would support Khrushchev's struggle for the party leadership
and usher in a new era of party-military relations.
D. KHRUSHCHEV AND THE MILITARY
Stalin died in March 1953 with no formal succession mechanism in place.
An intense power struggle ensued allowing the military to assert its position. The
struggle was between essentially two groups. One surrounded Khrushchev and
used the Central Committee and Secretariat as it power base. The other group
coalesced around Malenkov using the resources of the Party presidium and the
governmental bureaucracy. The influence of the military was sought by both
sides as crucial towards tipping the balance of power in their favor. Khrushchev
was able to generate powerful leverage in the military by his access to sections
of the Secretariat and the Defense Ministry that were in charge of promotions,
appointments and other personnel matters. This initiated several promotions of
Khrushchev's comrades from the Stalingrad group, and as a consequence,
strengthened Khrushchev's position. Malenkov was ousted in 1955. This was
51 Kolkowicz, R., The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, p. 243.
52 The Stalingrad group consisted of several officers that had participated in
the battle of Stalingrad. The front commanders became acquainted with
Khrushchev during this decisive battle, and used his prestigious position as head
of the Military Council to support them during their dealings with Zhukov and
the Stavka.
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followed by several promotions of officers to the rank of Marshal and Zhukov's
appointment as Defense Minister.
1. De-Stalinization
De-Stalinization had a very positive effect on civil-military relations.
Khrushchev denounced Stalin's legacy in his "secret speech" to the 20th Party
Congress in 1956. At the same time he announced the infallibility of the party
and officially acknowledged the acts of injustice committed against the officer
corps during the purges of 1937-38. This provided impetus for the rehabilitation
of the officer corps and a growing sense of security in voicing their opinion on
national security matters. Debates over the crucial role the army had played in
the war effort openly contradicted the previous party platform of Stalin. Blame
was cast directly upon Stalin for the poor performance in Poland and Finland.
The victories of the "Great Patriotic War" were used to bolster the military's
morale and prestige among society.
The repudiation of Stalin provided new latitudes for public debate
concerning questions of military doctrine. The role of nuclear weapon in Soviet
military strategy produced a great deal conflict between Khrushchev and the
military leadership. The debate centered on Khrushchev's sole reliance on nuclear
rockets for the defense of the Soviet Union. In lieu of these new weapons, he
proposed that other means of warfare were rendered obsolete. As a result the
ground, naval, and air forces were subjected to large cuts in there forces. The
military felt offended by Khrushchev's interference in what they thought was
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their political domain. They considered the sole reliance on an untested weapon
to be irresponsible. The concept of nuclear deterrence was also questioned as
being a dangerous source of security. Security they maintained could only be
ensured by an adequate conventional force to back it up with.
Despite Khrushchev's "meddling" directly in the affairs of strategic planning,
the military gained significant freedom in the arena of Soviet politics. The
increasingly high levels of technology being incorporated into new weapons
systems, and the enhanced role the military began to play in Soviet foreign policy
provided the impetus for future civil-military cooperation.
2. Zhukov's Decline
The rise and fall of Marshal Zhukov has been a central issue in the
study of civil-military relations. His immediate increase in stature when Stalin
died was not by accident. He still had significant political clout that was useful
for Khrushchev's power politics. He was named First Deputy Defense Minister
in 1953 and made a full member of the Central Committee. He succeeded
Bulganin as Defense Minister becoming the third professional officer to hold the
post. He was made a candidate member of the Presidium in 1956 and a full
member in 1957. His reincarnation gave the military great visibility and widen
their participation in Soviet politics. Four months after achieving the apex of his
career he was replaced as Defense Minister by Marshal Malinovskii - a member
of the Stalingrad group - and stripped of his party membership. Speculation as
to the reasons for this have dwelled on the perception that it was the result of a
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clash between the Party and the military. However, there are indications that the
reasons were multifaceted. There were five charges weighed against Zhukov that
have been portrayed as leading to his removal: that he plotted the actual
overthrow of the regime; disagreed on policy matters with civilian leaders;
sponsored a cult of his own personality; administered the army in a "non-party"
manner, and attacked military party organs. As Timothy Colton maintains, it was
a combination of contingencies, such as Zhukov's personality, his status as a
national hero, and his arrival in the Presidium as part of a precarious leadership
coalition that produce the outcome in 1957. 53 The uni-casual theory that it was
simply a manifestation of party-military conflict overlooks the several dimensions
of Zhukov's relationship to military politics.
Although the military had no direct hand in ouster of Khrushchev in 1964,
their acquiescence tended to bear out their displeasure with his decisions. It is
suggested that the military may have received some prior assurances from the
new leadership to correct the longstanding grievances against Khrushchev.
Despite their political gains under his rule, his "harebrained schemes" had
abashed the military on a global scale. The deployment and subsequent
withdrawal of intermediate range nuclear missiles from Cuba was disastrous to
the image of Soviet military power. Both the Party and the military had
witnessed significant losses in status as a world power. Witnessing its
53 Colton, T. J., Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority, p. 195.
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encirclement by the western "camp", the Soviet leadership coalesced and sought
to rebuild a military power second to none.
E. THE BREZHNEV ERA
Upon his assumption of power, Leonid Brezhnev was witness to a military
that was in a state of flux and a world subject to increasing international tension.
The whiplash created by Khrushchev's liberal policies produced a highly
conservative group of leaders in the Politburo. Brezhnev and his cohorts were all
too familiar with the impressions left by the war. In 1966, thirty-two percent of
the Politburo members had spent at least seven years of their earlier career in the
military or military related occupations. 54 They had sympathy for military
positions and gave them support. Brezhnev in unprecedented cooperation with
the military leadership was determined to increase the size of the armed forces
heralding in what came to be known as the "Golden Age" of Soviet military
power. The justification for the rapid build up was supported by an intense
propaganda campaign that reflected the urgency of military preparedness in the
age of nuclear weapons. A symbiotic relationship developed between the soldier
and the state as the Party catered to the military's every wish. It was estimated
that defense spending rose by fifteen percent in 1968.
Brezhnev's consolidation of power was far from complete in the mid-sixties
as members of the Politburo battled for the ranking positions. The fallout from
this struggle created divisions between the Party and military leadership. A clear
54 Colton, T.J. and Gustafson, T. eds., Soldier and the Soviet State, p. 47.
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illustration of this surrounded the death of the Defense Minister Malinovskii in
1967. The two aspiring people for the position were Dimitry Ustinov, a civilian
in charge of the defense industry, and Marshal Andrei Grechko, a professional
officer. Brezhnev was closely associated with both men during the war while
serving as a political officer. After considerable debate that lasted nearly two
weeks, the position was given to Marshal Grechko. The process which normally
takes significantly less time was an indication of the significant differences among
the Kremlin leadership. Several theories have been proposed as to why this was
so with little hard evidence to support them. It was most likely that Brezhnev
needed the support of the military lobby and therefore supported Grechko.
Grechko's main goals were to build a dual capable, balanced military based
on a combined arms concept. In light of this, he maintained a particularly strong
voice towards the subjects of arms control, budget allocations and the role of
technology. According to one source Grechko was the most outspoken opponent
of the SALT process and while reluctantly accepting the process, immediately
began a guerilla campaign in hope to stall the process. 55 He was highly
suspicious of the West. He was also very wary of the increased access the arms
control agenda had provided the civilian academics. To the military mind,
civilians, especially those from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often appeared to
55 Herspring, D. R., The Soviet High Command, 1967-1989: Personalities and
Politics, p. 75, Princeton University Press, 1990.
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be driven primarily by a desire to reach an agreement, even if this would mean
compromising (i.e. trading away Soviet advantage) with the other side. 56
1. The Rise of Military Autonomy
It was during Brezhnev's leadership, that the General Staff began to
reassert itself in defense decision-making. The General Staff was the primary
beneficiary of the trend toward "scientific management". 57 This technocratic style
was the result of the increasingly sophisticated technology that was being
incorporated into modern weapons. It was based on deference to specialized
agencies and the resolution of disagreements through bureaucratic compromise. 58
Once Khrushchev was ousted from power, the military lobbied for control of the
military-technical sphere of defense decision-making. Marshal Zakharov (who
was removed following the Cuban missile crisis) was reinstalled as Chief of the
General Staff in 1964. He argued forcefully for "scientific approaches" to military
planning and against "subjectivism and volunteerism", code words for Stalin's and
Khrushchev's interventions into military affairs. 59 Approaches to strategy began
to be formed on a highly technical basis. Integrated formulas and techniques
56 Herspring, p. 78.
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such as operations research, systems analysis, and decision theory began to refine
the laws of warfare. Specific principals of warfare were investigated by the
General Staff Academy using historical precedents from<the Great Patriotic War.
The General Staff was able to eliminate its competitors largely because parallelism
and overlapping authority could not be tolerated. Brezhnev was determined to
acquire military power fast and in a race with technically and economically
superior states resulting in a streamlined system for military planning.60
2. The End of the Golden Age
The early 1970's had brought about detente and recognition of the
Soviet Union's superpower status. Brezhnev continued to pursue further arms
control measures as the main pillar of Soviet foreign policy. He also became
increasingly wary of Soviet economic problems. The military build up and
emphasis on heavy industry had led to the demise of the domestic sector.
Military expansion soured detente. The USSR began to assist the Cuban
interventions in Angola (1975) and Ethiopia (1977), cheered the pro-Cuban
takeovers in Grenada and Nicaragua, and invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In 1977,
the Kremlin began deploying the SS-20 missiles targeted on Western Europe and
then on Asia. These actions created a backlash to detente as military buildups in




At the height of detente in 1973, Marshal Grechko, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs Andrei Gromyko and KGB Chief Yuriy Andropov all became full
members of the Politburo. It is speculated that by making Grechko a full member
of the Politburo, Brezhnev sought to placate Grechko and gain his support.
However it was unsuccessful. Despite their close friendship, their relationship
began to deteriorate as differences in opinion on arms control and defense
expenditures continued. Grechko asserted that only Soviet military might could
guarantee against a new world war. He balked at the signing of the Vladivostok
Accords in 1972 suggesting that the Soviets had made unnecessary concessions.
Brezhnev moved to oppose Grechko and reduce his status in the Defense Council.
Beginning in 1973, he revised the membership of the Council to include the two
ranking Central Committee Secretaries after himself, Suslov and Kirilenko. By
adding these two members, civilian access to military decision-making was
enhanced and greater political leverage applied to Grechko and the military
membership of the Council.
The end of the "golden age" was signalled by Brezhnev's call for "full
abundance" of consumer goods in 1974. The transition was accelerated by the
death of Marshal Grechko in late April 1976. In a clear indication of his
reaffirmed control over the military Brezhnev was pronounced Chairman of the
Defense Council and promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Shortly after the appointment of Dimitry Ustinov to the post of Defense Minister
signaled a significant loss in the military's political clout as they lost their seat on
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the Politburo and the Defense Council. Brezhnev in a clear sign of the new
course to be taken in defense matters replaced the Chief of the General Staff
Marshal Victor Kulikov with Marshal Nickolai Ogarkov. This appointment marks
a watershed for civil-military relations for several reasons. Ogarkov was the first
technical officer ever promoted to the position. With his background, he brought
new emphasis on scientific and technical principals. His expertise in formulating
strategy have been ranked with that of Frunze and Tukhachevskii. In stark
contrast to Ustinov, who had little military-technical background, Ogarkov's
expertise gave the military greater autonomy in the military-technical sphere.
Ogarkov because of his personality was very outspoken. He had opposed the
Grechko and Kulikov on several issues. His advocacy of an imminent scientific-
technological revolution in military affairs, rejection of the longstanding
preference for tried and true weaponry and his authorship of a highly
controversial plan to reorganize the command and control system put him in
good standing with Brezhnev.
3. Ogarkov's Opposition
Initially Ogarkov worked closely within the parameters laid down by
the leadership - the military would have to do more with less. Shortly after
assuming the position of Chief of the General Staff, Ogarkov stated that the army
and the navy "had everything necessary to defend the Soviet Union. 61 However,
61 Herspring, D.R., The Soviet High Command, p. 156.
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his complacency with the leadership changed as his initial expectations of
economic recovery and arms control suffered setbacks. Specific issues of concern
were: the implementation of the West's "two track" approach towards NATO, the
SALT II treaty was not ratified by the U.S. Congress, and the U.S. military build
up under the Carter and Reagan administrations. In 1980, Ogarkov gave his first
signs of disquiet over the dual track decision on INF. He warned:
It [the missile deployment] would not only disrupt the approximate balance
of medium range nuclear missiles systems that has been created in Europe,
but would also lead to a sharp qualitative change in the political-military
situation since it would create the threat of surprise suppression of our
strategic nuclear forces.62
Ogarkov became increasingly at odds with both Brezhnev and Ustinov concerning
the military's budget and detente. His focus on high technology weapons
demanded further increases and investment in military spending. By using
arguments from the 1960's, Ogarkov warned against the sole reliance on nuclear
weapons and the need for "proportional" development of conventional forces.
More than the usual ferment in civil-military relations began to occur
through 1981-1982 concerning the stagnating economy and lack of definitive
leadership. Brezhnev had obviously seen the need to mend the civil-military
divide in 1982. Two All Army-Party conferences were convened to articulate the




conference in nine years indicating the importance of the agenda.63 Its objective
was to quell the resistance to changes in budget allocations in favor of the
domestic spending. Ustinov bolstered the "truly titanic work" Brezhnev had
accomplished "by strengthening the motherland's economic and defensive might
and consolidating its international positions and prestige and preserving peace on
earth."64 He also addressed Ogarkov's outspoken remarks that had increasingly
become a thorn in the leadership's side. Issued in as a counterpoint to Ogarkov's
call for more professional autonomy he reasserted "the CPSU formulates military
policy and military doctrine and. ..guides the development of Soviet military
science and military art".65 In clear signal of support for Brezhnev cause, he
consistently referred to him as the chairman of the Defense Council.
The second conference in October was a continuing effort to promote
reduced military spending in lieu of the upcoming Central Committee meeting
in November which would decide the budget. Brezhnev's speech echoed his
indebtiveness to Ustinov for his support referring to him as a "loyal son of the
Leninist Party". 66 Both Brezhnev and Ustinov voiced their strong support for the
Food Program and the need to strengthen defense by using those funds already
63 Parker, Kremlin in Transition:From Brezhnev to Chernenko, 1978 to 1985,








provided with greater efficiency. Ustinov stressed the need for restraint in the
face of imperialism's growing aggressiveness and praised the steady growth of
Soviet might under Brezhnev.67
F. THE YEARS OF SUCCESSION
1. Andropov
The death of Brezhnev on November 11, 1982 brought little change to
defense policies and priorities. Yurii Andropov though decisively defeating
Chernenko as head of the Party maintained a fragile balance of power. There
ensued a power struggle between Andropov and Chernenko for the leading
position in government. One result of the struggle left the posts of the Presidium
of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Chairman of the Defense Council vacant
until June 1983. Marshal Ustinov was clearly the second most powerful person
in the Politburo. The extent of his power left perception in the West that the
military had the exclusive attention of Andropov. U.S. News had posed the
question "Is the Military Taking over the Kremlin?" in light of Ustinov's
influence.68 Andropov was supported by Marshal Ustinov for his experience on
foreign policy as well as his tough stance and discipline with regard to domestic
matters. Despite early patronage to the military, Andropov was cool towards the
67 Parker, p. 173.
68 Daniloff, N. and Knight, R., "Is Military Taking Over the Kremlin?", US
News and World Report, 23 January 1984, p. 26.
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military and their influence. He continue to maintain that consumer goods have
priority over further military spending. Andropov was instrumental in bringing
a new generation of leadership to Moscow. Some of the new faces included
Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Ligachev, and Yakovlev. Of significance to the civil-military
debate was the promotion of Sergei Akhromeyev in March 1983 to Marshal of the
Soviet Union under cutting Ogarkov's primacy. Partisanship seemed to be
infecting the supreme command as Ogarkov and Akhromeyev were lining up on
opposite sides of the political barricade; Akhromeyev siding with Andropov and
Ogarkov with Chernenko. 69
Andropov's deteriorating health did not allow him to establish dominant
support within the Politburo. His outlook towards military spending had not
changed its course since Brezhnev. In the face of the increasing threat from
NATO's modernization of its nuclear arsenal, he called for restraint stating that
"We have sufficient strength to counter imperialism's military threat."70 His
intense propaganda scheme directed at breaking apart the western alliance ended
in failure as modernization went ahead as scheduled in November 1983. The
failure of these efforts would transformed Soviet foreign policy and evolve into
Gorbachev's main platform of "New Thinking". At the June 1983 Plenum of the
Central Committee he remarked:




"The threat of a nuclear war overhanging mankind causes one to reappraise
the principal goals of the activities of the entire communist movement."71
Andropov continued to waver on the conditions of arms control with little
result. Ogarkov had predicted the INF deployment would go ahead despite
Soviet efforts to prevent it. He continued to press the civil-military boundaries
with his harsh tones towards the West. Had it not been for the support of
Chernenko his tenure as Chief of the General Staff would have ended sooner than
it did. Events such as the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight 007 in 1983
continued to enhance Ogarkov's visibility in Soviet politics. Fully aware of
Ustinov's poor health he continued to aspire to higher positions in the hierarchy.
Andropov died on February 9, 1984. Rumors that Chernenko had bargained with
Andropov for the top leadership of the Politburo came to light as within 24 hours
of Andropov's death he was proclaimed General Secretary.
2. Chernenko
In his brief thirteen months in power, Chernenko was consistently
plagued by ill health leading to policies that were often contradictory and marked
by gridlock. During his leadership, civil-military relations were struck by the
foreseen removal of Ogarkov in lieu of Ustinov's death and the continuation of





Ogarkov continued to be outspoken and attacked the leadership's
policies with impunity. However, rumors began to circulate concerning the
Ogarkov's fate as Ustinov's health was in decline. There was speculation that
Akhromeyev was being groomed for the position of Chief of the General Staff
and that Ogarkov would replace the dying Ustinov. With Chernenko
incapacitated by his illness a "temporary alliance" developed between Mikhail
Gorbachev and Ustinov on defense and foreign policy issues. 72 On September
6, 1984 the announcement of Ogarkov's dismissal came. The causes of his
removal from Moscow to command the Western theater of military operations
(TVD) have been the focus of many studies. His outspokenness was surely a
contributing factor. He continued to press for greater military spending and at
the same time undermined the effectiveness of arms control. Some say that it was
Ustinov that removed Ogarkov warning on his death bed to beware of his
intentions. Dale Herspring supports the view that it was the outcome of an
intense power struggle, to which the thought of a person like Ogarkov in a
policy-making position was unbearable. What finally triggered his dismissal was
that the civilian leadership feared a greater crisis concerning the replacement of
Ustinov.73 The decision to place Ogarkov in the Western TVD afforded him
72
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73 Herspring, D. R., The Soviet High Command, p. 222.
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control of the most important multi-front commands, and avoided another
political showdown. It was a post the was ideally suited for maneuvering
Ogarkov out of contention as Ustinov's successor without risking political
backlash. The appointment of Marshal Sergei Sokolov allowed the civilian
leadership to avoid another conflict in civil-military relations. Due to Sokolov's
age however, his appointment was seen by the military as a conciliatory gesture.
It conveyed an underlying message of mistrust and was clearly designed to
neutralize the military during the imminent succession of Chernenko.
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III. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
A. LOOKING AT THE MILITARY WITH A "FRESH EYE"
Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party in
March 1985. He assumed this role in a period of heightened international tension
in which the Soviet Union found itself isolated. The economy was stagnated from
the endless years of military commitment. Gorbachev had as his single major
goal, economic revitalization. As Stephen Meyer maintains he recognized two
major obstacles to his economic restructuring. The first was the entrenched
attitude of the bureaucracy and the labor force towards responsibility,
accountability and authority.74 His means of correcting these problems was the
promotion of glasnost and democratization by basing rewards and sanctions
based on performance not position. The second major obstacle was the defense
agenda. It was not just the huge amount of resources being committed to
defense, but rather the further commitment implied by threat assessments and
requirements derived from traditional thinking. "More elbow room for economic
restructuring required lifting the shadow of a further military buildup in the
1990's and beyond which in turn meant that Gorbachev had to gain control over
74 Meyer, S. M., "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political
Thinking on Security", International Security, Vol.13, No.2, Fall 1988, pp. 128-129.
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and restructure the defense agenda."75 An early example of the party's increased
control over the military was clearly reflected by the conspicuous absence of any
military representatives atop of Lenin's mausoleum during Chernenko's funeral.
Gorbachev viewed the military through a different "historical lens" than his
predecessors, placing him at odds with the older generation of leadership. The
building of the Soviet military had indeed been a noteworthy achievement of
previous regimes, but it was now on the threshold of rapid depreciation by
western technological challenge. Seen in this light, Gorbachev sought to diffuse
East-West tension and provide the ideological impetus to revive his economy
through his "new political thinking". The formal announcement of his platform
was conducted at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in February 1986. A
watershed in civil-military relations had emerged.
1. New Thinking, Perestroika and Soviet Security
The ideas behind "New Thinking" are not new. They have been used
by Soviet and Western writers throughout the 1970's and 1980's. What is new is
that they have been joined together to form a cohesive or coherent view of world
politics. Several points of new thinking had a direct impact on future civil-
military relations. The first concerned the realization that the issues concerning
all of mankind at the international level were becoming more interdependent.




efforts of humanity for the sake of its self preservation."76 A specific issue that
required cooperation was security in the context of the nuclear age. A
fundamental principal is of war prevention: "Nuclear war can not be a means of
achieving political, economic, ideological or any other goals...Nuclear war is
senseless; it is irrational. ..their would neither be winners nor losers in a global
nuclear conflict: world civilization would inevitably perish."77 Gorbachev went
further to emphasize that conventional war with the advent of sophisticated
technology "would now be comparable to nuclear war in its a destructive
effects."
78 With this as a pretext, he emphasized that security is "indivisible". "It
is either equal security for all or none at all."79 "Universal", or mutual security
he stated must proceed along a broad front and bear in mind unilateral steps
could not be taken "for fear that they may serve as temptation for the advocates
of global national interests". 80 Gorbachev condemned the issue of nuclear
deterrence stating that "security can no longer be assured by military means -
76 Gorbachev, M. S., Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World,










neither by use of arms or deterrence, nor by continuous perfection of the sword
and the shield.81
Gorbachev gave new impetus to foreign affairs by suggesting that the only
way to achieve security is through diplomatic means and disarmament. "In our
age, genuine and equal security can be guaranteed by constantly lowering the
level of the strategic balance from which nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction should be completely eliminated. 82 He emphasized that all military
alliances should be disbanded and the European direction of Soviet foreign policy
was the "most important one." Referring to Europe as "Our European Home" he
appealed for closer economic and cultural ties and integrated security
arrangements. Using the idea of "security for all"83 he emphasized the need for
Europe to dissociate themselves from the dangerous extreme of American policy.
"The world currently stands at a crossroads he stated, and in which direction it
will pursue depends largely on Europe's political position."84
In what would become the most drawn out debate within the context of
civil-military relations was the issue raised by "reasonably sufficient" levels of










defense. These issues signified the largest encroachment by civilian leaders into
what was once the military's domain and will be discussed below.
In sum, Gorbachev's ideology was the touchstone that fundamentally altered
the civil-military framework. Gorbachev's promotion of a "comprehensive system
of international security" provided a flexible grab bag to overshadow the military.
Military power was devalued and perceived as complicating perestroika by
absorbing large resources needed for industrial modernization and impeding the
development of cooperative international relations. The military would soon find
its once autonomous position under attack from all sectors of society and it
political clout eroded. Disarmament and arms control received increased priority
as a means to facilitate domestic economic recovery.
2. Early Military Reaction
Gorbachev laid out his plans for the military in a speech at Minsk in
July 1985. The details of the "secret speech" are unavailable but several sources
indicate that the principal issues concerned personnel reforms and the need to
reinvigorate the civilian economy by using technology from the military-industrial
sector. It was thought that Gorbachev's remarks may have been so harsh that the
text could not be published. The General Staff evidently reacted with "shock and
horror" to Gorbachev's impressions of the military's organization.85
85 Gelman, H., Gorbachev's First Five Years in the Soviet Leadership: The Clash of
Personalities and the Remaking of Institutions, RAND Corporation, May 1990, p. 86.
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Early response by the military was met with both ambivalence and
resistance. The High Command felt that the sluggish economy was the problem
of society and the party, not the military's. However, they also welcomed the
prospect of a stimulated industrial base for improved weapons technology.
Perestroika was promoted in generally three forms: closeness to the people
(blizosf k lyudyam), exactingness (trebovatel'nost), and personal responsibility
(lichnaya otvetstvennost')86 Essentially these terms implied that officers would
have to accept greater responsibility for the performance of their men and
increase the effectiveness of their managerial activities. The drive was to increase
the performance and attitude of military personnel. Responsibility for the
implementation was placed with the Main Political Administration (MPA).
New Thinking and perestroika did not begin to find resonance within the
military establishment until early 1987. Marshal Akhromeyev, was the first to
signal his acceptance of new thinking following the Twenty Seventh Party
Congress. As a signal of his consensus with the civilian leadership he revised the
one volume edition of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary that had appeared
under the editorial direction of Marshal Ogarkov. In it he made a clear statement
paralleling the tenants of Gorbachev's new thinking. Under the definition of
military strategy he states that "the most important task of Soviet military strategy
86 Herspring, D. R., "On Perestroika: Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military",
Problems of Communism, July-August 1987, pp 100-101.
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is working out the problems for preventing war.87 The renewed accent on
preventing war and toning down anti-western sentiment reflected the efforts
Gorbachev was making at Geneva and Reykjavik on arms control and
disarmament.
Sokolov's backsliding continued throughout 1986. It was not until Armed
Forces Day, February 1987, that he publicly stated that war prevention was the
"main proposition" of Soviet military doctrine. In late May a major declaration
by the Warsaw Pact summit in Warsaw stated categorically: "the use of military
means for resolving any disputed question is intolerable in the present
conditions."88 It elaborated their ultimate goal was the reduction of the armed
forces and conventional armaments down to a level when neither side, in
ensuring defense, would have the means for a sudden attack on the other side or
foe starting offensive operations in general. 89









The pace of reform was sluggish and a source of frustration for
Gorbachev. Conservative forces within the military continued to dominate and
provide an impasse to reform. One of the earliest moves by Gorbachev to assert
his control over the military was the appointment of General Dimitry Yazov to
the position of Deputy Minister of Defense for Personnel. Gorbachev had been
impressed early on by Yazov's performance in the Far East. In Gorbachev's
opinion Yazov showed himself to be a "courageous and principled
Communist". ..he showed devotion to principal in attacking corruption and
protectionism...which had literally put to root many echelons of cadres."90 Yazov
replaced Ivan Shkadov, who in the wake of the Korean Airlines shoot down in
September 1983, had pressed for greater authority for commanders and more
resources for the military.91 A great deal of resentment among senior officers
developed as Yazov acted as Gorbachev's point man for the removal of personnel
not supportive of perestroika.
With Yazov in place, restructuring finally began to hit the military
establishment with a more noticeable force. Akhromeyev foreshadowed the
coming events in his Armed Forces Day article calling for an "influx of fresh
90 Gelman, H., Gorbachev and the Future of the Soviet Military institution,
Adelphi Paper, No. 258, Spring 1991, Brassey, p. 35.
91
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55
forces into the leadership's posts."92 There was growing pressure on the
Sokolov's performance during the first half of 1987. He was moving with the
flow of perestroika while at the same time slowing its advance. His animosity
towards Gorbachev dated back to his succession of Ustinov as Defense Minister.
He had been snubbed by the leadership in his bid for full membership in the
Politburo and remained only a candidate to the position. Sokolov's career ended
with surprising suddenness when nineteen-year-old Mathius Rust buzzed the
Lenin mausoleum and landed his Cessna aircraft on the edge of Red Square on
the evening of May 28, Boarder Guard Day. Within twenty four hours of the
incident, Sokolov's retirement was announced by a Supreme Soviet decree along
with the firing of the Air Defense Chief Koldunov. Yazov was promoted as
Defense Minister and replace Sokolov as a candidate member to the Politburo a
month later.
The removal of Sokolov ushered in a wave of personnel changes at all levels
of command. Table (I) indicates the significance of Gorbachev's changes.93 As
of 1989 Gorbachev had made six change in the Ministry of Defense Collegium,
which represents the top military leadership, and includes the Minister of Defense
and his sixteen deputies. This in addition to the seven changes made during the
first two years, brings a total of fifteen changes to the seventeen member
92
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Table I: NEW APPOINTMENTS IN
Collegium. The officers that replaced REGIONAL COMMANDS, 1972-1989.
those that were removed were
recognized for their politicized
attitudes and support for perestroika.
The new appointee's were also much
younger, as the average age was 63
years.94 Several articles written by
these officers indicate that they are more attuned to issues such as the nationality
problems, the anti-corruption campaign and organizational restructuring in the
military.
Gorbachev preferred to select officers making up two distinct groups; the
Far Easterners and the Afghantsy.95 Among the Far-Easterners were Army
Generals Ivan Tret'yak, and Vladimir Govorov, Commander in Chief of the Air
Defenses and head of the USSR civil defense respectively. The appointment of
Colonel General Mikhail Moiseev, also from the Far Eastern district, as Chief of
the General Staff in December 1988 was a radical step to undermine the authority
of the military. Moiseev had never held a high level post prior to his selection
and was promoted over several senior qualified officers with the approval of
94 Herspring, D. R., "The Soviet Military and Change", Survival, Jul/Aug, Vol.
31, No. 4, 1989, p. 325.
95 The Afghantsy were officers who had gained combat experience during the
war in Afghanistan. Zamascikov, S., Personnel Changes in the Soviet Military,
p. 8.
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Yazov. It was clearly evident that Gorbachev did not want a military genius; all
he needed was a younger, unconnected military organizer whose major quality
was loyalty.96
Participation in the war in Afghanistan was seen as a positive step towards
a successful career in the military. Ironically, the initial invasion was not
sanctioned by the military as the decision seems to have been concluded between
Brezhnev, Ustinov and Gromyko without the consulting the military.97 The
Afghantsy have established a reputation of being "difficult" and unwilling to
compromise and often inclined toward getting in trouble with their superiors.
Arguments and dissociation among other officers who "were not" in the war
became increasingly prevalent.98
2. The New Political System and Civilian Dominance
In addition to the profound adjustments in military personnel,
Gorbachev also introduced a host of aspiring players from outside the uniformed
ranks into the decision-making process. Institutions were restructured and
streamlined to effectively carry out reform. The result was a significant loss in
military influence and autonomy in defense decision-making.
96 Hauner, M. and Rahr, A., "New Chief of Soviet General Staff Appointed",
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RL 546/88, December 16, 1988, p. 3.
97 See Varennikov's interview Ogonyok, No. 12, 1989. Varennikov was a
member of the Soviet High Command in charge of operations in Afghanistan, in
Zamascikov, S., Changes in the Soviet Military Leadership Since 1987, p. 10.
98 Zamascikov, S., p. 8.
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One of the earliest means of enhancing civilian control over the military was
the restructuring of the Defense Council. The Defense Council served in different
historical capacities and was often a reflection of the Soviet leaders particular style
of controlling the military. The Council served as the main forum of civil-military
interaction. It is the only body that had the power to coordinate the operational
activities of all military and security forces." The Council had four major
functions. The most significant function concerned the adoption and confirmation
of the biggest strategic military programs with an emphasis on hardware
allocation, development and improvement. 100 In the more recent context, the
Council was also involved in the debate concerning arms reduction, cuts in
programs, and the conversion of military production facilities to civilian use. As
a second function, the council evaluated the decisions already put into effect such
as the strategic consequences of arms control decisions. Of considerable relevance
during Gorbachev's tenure was the consideration of unilateral initiatives
discussed below. Third, the Defense Council oversaw the internal organization
and deployment of the armed forces, including inter alia, such matters as
mobilization readiness plans, and conscription and manpower policies. 101
99 Yasman, V., "The Internal Security Situation in the USSR and the Defense
Council", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RL 398/89, September, 1, 1989, p. 9.




Finally, the Council decides Soviet strategy and doctrine. It was within this
domain that Gorbachev launched his program for military reform.
The Defense Council inherited by Gorbachev had atrophied. Gorbachev,
commenting on the Councils structure prior to reform, stated "that its functions
lead to the concentration of the whole problem literally into the hands of several
men. ..if not into just one man's hands, and we are reaping the fruits of this...."102
He quickly established a coalition that promoted his reforms by fundamentally
changing the membership of the Council. Traditional positions occupied by the
General Secretary, the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Chief of the
General Staff were kept in place. However, in order to broaden the consensus of
military and civilian opinion, additional members were added. On the military
side these included the heads of the service branches at the Deputy Defense
Minister level as well as the addition of the Chief of the Main Political
Directorate. 103 The military membership was offset by the addition of the senior
Central Committee Secretary in charge of military industry, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the KGB chairman, and the head of the State Planning
Committee. For the first time since Stalin's day, Gorbachev had brought all of the
important national security interests and players together around one table. 104
102 Fukuyama, F., "Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection







In addition to the Defense Council there was another body created sometime
after 1986 within the Politburo to coordinate the evolution of Soviet arms control
positions. Known as the Commission for Arms Control Coordination, its specific
task was to deal with the military and technical aspects of international politics
including the preparations for talks on arms reductions. 105 Lev Zaykov was
made chairman with additional membership provided to fellow politburo
members Edward Shevardnadze, then the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
Alexandr Yakovlev, head of the Central Committee Commission for International
Policy. According to an interview with the Zaykov the commission contained
leaders of the sub-politburo rank from the defense ministry, the KGB, the military
industrial commission of the Council of Ministers (the VPK) and other
departments. 106
The commission also had working organ associated with it called the
"interdepartmental group". 107 Experts from the Ministry of Defense, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scientists and experts from the USSR Academy of
Science and scientific research centers of the General Staff. A fundamental role
was also delegated to the International Department of the Central Committee, in
which a special subcommittee, lead by Oleg Baklanov, prepared arms negotiations
agenda.






By far the most important individuals to significantly change the scope of
civil-military relations were Shevardnadze, and Yakovlev. This coalition
combined to assert its dominance in all spheres of defense and foreign policy and
place it under the guise of a "comprehensive strategy for international affairs".
Gorbachev's close alliance with these men gave them substantial political clout
over the military. Under the tenets of new thinking, the emphasis on diplomatic
means for achieving international stability was interpreted by the Foreign Minister
and Yakovlev as a mandate to monitor the actions of the military. The pace of
the East-West negotiations starting in 1985, also allowed those bureaucracies
directly involved greater access.
Immediately after assuming his post in 1985, Shevardnadze conducted a
wholesale purge of the ministry, as seven out of eight first deputies were replaced
by those sympathetic to new thinking. In 1986, the MFA created the Directorate
of Arms Control and Disarmament. The Scientific Information Center was
implemented to link decision making bodies to outside experts and coordinate
academic research.
Other institutions quickly developed at the insistence of Gorbachev. The
International Department of the Central Committee created a Department of
Military Affairs and Disarmament headed by Lt Gen Victor Stardubov, an expert
in arms control. A number of defense institutes created under Khrushchev's
leadership have been allowed increased access to the defense decisions. Among
the two dozen or more of these institutes, the most important include the Institute
62
of the USA and Canada (IUSAC), and the Institute of World Economics and
International Relations (IMEMO).
Gorbachev's strategy to assert greater control over the military was evident
by the shift in decision-making power of the Central Committee to the Supreme
Soviet. At the Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, Gorbachev proposed the
creation of an "effective mechanism" to ensure the renewal of the political
system. 108 In an effort to promote popular support for perestroika he called for
the election of a new Congress of People's Deputies who would in turn elect a
Supreme Soviet to replace the existing rubber stamp body. Despite resistance, a
reconstituted Supreme Soviet was formed in December 1988. The new Supreme
Soviet had the authority to "appoint the Defense Council, replace the higher
command of the armed forces, define principal defense and national security
measures, call a general or partial mobilization, declare war, and be responsible
for decision on using military contingents should it be necessary to meet
international treaty based commitments to maintain peace and security." 109
Another provision was added stipulating that the job of the Chairman of the
Defense Council was reserved for the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet -
Gorbachev - putting his position as head of the Defense Council on a new
108 Van Oudenaren, J., The Role of Shevardnadze and the Minisrty of Foreign
Affairs in the Making of Soviet Defense and Arms Control Policy, RAND Corporation




constitutionally enshrined basis. Despite this effort, an effective mechanism to
control and coordinate military affairs did not result.
In June 1989, the newly elected Supreme Soviet formed a joint Committee
for Defense and State Security of the Council of the Union and the Council of the
Nationalities. 110 The committee membership consisted of forty-three members,
nineteen of whom are employed in the defense industry. Other representatives
included a number of military officers, academics, intellectuals and industrial
executives. Although it was originally designed to be the watch dog of the
defense establishment, its military representation gave the committee little
impetus to promote significant reform.
The actual amount of influence these groups had is questionable. However,
the fact that they have broader access to military data and policy produced
additional pressure on the military to generate precise policy with respect to troop
and hardware deployment. There were numerous signs of mounting military
backlash against the unwelcome meddling in defense matters by what the High
Command regarded as "self-promoting academic dilettantes." 111 While
Gorbachev provided a broader role to civilians, the military still constituted a
substantial force in both the Defense Council and the various new committees.
110 Tsypkin, M, "The Committee for Defense and State Security of the USSR
Supreme Soviet", Report on the USSR, RL 209/90, April 23, 1990, pp. 8-11.
111 Lambeth, B. S., Is Soviet Defense Policy Becoming Civilianized? , RAND
Corporation (R-3939-USDP) August 1990, p. 38.
64
There function as secretariat of each group gave them substantial control over the
information provided to each forum. It was the General Staff's task to provide
the agenda, briefings, and present options based on their expertise. Therefore,
even though the membership of each panel was broadened, the military retained
a traditional advantage over their civilian counterparts. Without an effective
civilian staff to counteract the military's monopoly of the issues, the actual control
the civilian leadership has over the defense debate remains questionable.
C. THE DEBATE OVER NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
As civilian access increased in the defense decision making process,
mounting public criticism of the military occurred as well. The conclusion of the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987 brought heightened criticism to
military policies from all sectors of society. Critics have accused the army of
virtually every sin conceivable from incompetence and committing atrocities
during World War II, to falsifying the historical truth in order to spare Stalin's
image long after his death. Demands for radical cuts in the military's budget and
force structure, a reduction of military service, an end to conscription and the
adoption of a professional army; attacks on the personal privileges of generals
and the Soviet army's role in the non-Russian republics became widespread. The
decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, taken in late 1987, announced in
February 1988 and put into effect on May 1988 contributed to the sweeping trend
in the disillusionment to what one Soviet officer referred to as the "fall in the
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prestige of the professional defender of the motherland." 112 Civil-military
tension grew at an alarming rate. The military became highly critical of the
reform process, and the close group associated with Gorbachev. This created a
whiplash effect in Gorbachev's attitude toward the military as he began to shift
to the political right. The major issues subject to sharp debate included: doctrine
and defense organization, the budget, glasnost and secrecy, arms control, and
nationality and internal order problems.
1. Doctrinal Revolution and Reorganization
The potential for a clash of perspectives was seen at two distinct levels
of Soviet military doctrine. The socio-political level considers the nature,
objectives, and initiation of war and is controlled by the political leadership. The
military-technical level dealt with the issues of military strategy, science and
operations and is considered the realm of the military professionals. 113 The two
reflect the dichotomy between the prevention of war and the preparation for
war... in peacetime the two need not clash, yet in a crisis the trade-offs between
them are likely to be more intense. 114 The Soviets have always stressed their
benign political intent when discussing doctrine at the socio-political level, but
military strategy at the military-technical level has always emphasized the
112 German, H., Gorbachev and the Future of the Soviet Military Institution, p. 27.
113 Legro, J. W., "Soviet Crisis Decision-making and the Gorbachev Reforms",




primacy of offensive operations. Under Gorbachev, this dicotomy dissolved and
the subjects within the military-technical sphere became subject to scrutiny as
well.
A major area of disagreement between civilian leadership and the military
was over the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" and the adoption of a defensive
strategy. Change in military doctrine under Gorbachev was part of a general
evolution that began in the late 1970's. The de-emphasis of achieving military
superiority, and the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers began a
fundamental revision in Soviet security policy. Marshal Ogarkov was one of the
first to recognize the importance of high technology and the benefits of mobility
in a future war. He down played the value of the giant stockpiles of strategic
nuclear systems. It was within this context that the military successors under
Gorbachev would debate future military doctrine.
During the very early stages of Gorbachev's leadership, he made it clear that
restructuring the economy would require parallel changes in the military. The
defense budget, which had occupied some 20-25 percent of the gross national
product and continued to rise at the rate of two percent per year since the mid-
1970's, was a prime target for cuts. During his speech to the Twenty Seventh
Party Congress in February 1986, Gorbachev stressed that he was interested in
"restricting military potential within the limits of reasonable sufficiency". 115 He
115 Pravda, February 26, 1986, in Soviet National Security Policy Under
Perestroika, Hudson, G. E. ed. 1990, p. 180.
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continued to refine his 1986 position stating that reasonable sufficiency is that
level of military potential required to accomplish only "defensive tasks". 116 He
stated further that the armed forces must be structured such that they "be
sufficient to repel possible aggression, but not sufficient to conduct offensive
operations.
Gorbachev's motivations for promoting the concept of reasonable sufficiency
were clear. By emphasizing the increased role of political diplomacy the Soviets
had realized that military might and brut force were no longer a productive
means of policy. Therefore, they adopted a less subtle approach that sought to
diminish western perceptions of the military threat by the Soviet Union and
weaken the Western collective defense efforts. Arms control was one of the main
pillars of this process. Reductions in Soviet military forces could then take place
under less hostile encirclement. This would in turn free up the necessary
resources needed to improve the Soviet economy. It would also reestablish party
control through extensive debate.
The polemic over reasonable sufficiency developed on two levels: strategic
nuclear and conventional. On the strategic nuclear level there was a consensus
between the military and the civilians. They both agreed that there was room for
large cuts in nuclear stockpiles while continuing to maintain parity. Reasonable
sufficiency by most civilian analysts have asserted that Soviet strategic force
116
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structure needed to be both roughly equal in size to that of the U.S., and capable
of inflicting unacceptable retaliatory damage. 117 Analysts from the Institute of
the U.S. and Canada went even farther to assert that as long as the Soviet Union
had the ability to inflict unacceptable damage, it would not need proximate
nuclear parity to ensure Soviet security. They propose unilateral measures to
reduce the size of the stockpile to avoid waiting for negotiated equal cuts.
The military leadership was prepared to accept deep equitable cuts in
strategic forces. The High Command agreed that the huge stockpiles of nuclear
weapons did not enhance Soviet security. However they rejected the idea of
unilateral measures and nuclear inferiority in strategic systems. Any reductions
would have to be mutual and roughly equal preserving parity.
At the conventional level, reasonable sufficiency had different connotations
as it has been obscured by a campaign to characterize the Soviet and Warsaw Pact
doctrine as fundamentally defensive. 118 Elaborated in 1986 at Budapest, and at
its May 1987 meeting in East Berlin, the Political Consultative Committee (PCC)
of the Warsaw Pact committed itself to the concepts of reasonable sufficiency.
They also adopted a doctrine that was purely defensive and stated, henceforth the
Pact would strive to maintain an East-West military balance at the lowest possible
117 Warner III, E. L., "New Thinking and Old Realities in Soviet defense





119 Sufficiency initially was equated with current NATO and Warsaw Pact
force postures adequate to repulse the aggressor.
Defense Minister Yazov, although agreeing to the substance of the Pact's
declaration made allowances for possible objection from leading military circles.
He define sufficiency in rather vague terms saying that currently "it means
precisely the magnitude of armed forces necessary to defend oneself against
attack from outside forces." 120 In other words Yazov was continuing to advocate
parity with the West.
A point made by Gorbachev that lead to splits among the military
leadership and broad interpretations was that "the Soviet Union would not seek
greater security over other nations", but at the same time "it could not accept
inferiority". 121 The term "inferiority" used in this sense provided the source of
controversy. Three groups within the military have articulated different positions.
A pro-Gorbachev group represented by the majority of the High Command,
maintained much of the same arguments as Gorbachev. However, they rejected
unilateral or asymmetrical initiatives in arms control, while at the same time
agreed that parity was not necessary. This group agrees that the U.S. remains a
threat to Soviet interests and also see political means as the method of easing
119
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international tension. They consider cuts in the military budget essential to
promoting an economic recovery.
A more undecided group within the military promotes a variant of
reasonable sufficiency by referring to it as "sufficient defense." 123 This group
acknowledges the need for reform in the abstract, but is opposed to cut of the
military's needs. Strategic parity is strongly advocated, and they are highly
critical of unilateral arms control proposals.
Oppositionist military leaders resort to the standard phrase, "reliable
defense". 124 This group describes defense issues in the traditional means by
advocating increased military expenditures and rejecting Gorbachev's intentions
to alter Soviet doctrine. This group argues that reform in the military should
serve to strengthen military discipline and improve weaponry and equipment.125
Military leaders maintain a different view on the subject of a defensive
doctrine as well. They insist that while Soviet strategy was defensive, a capability
to strike a counter-offensive blow was necessary because of NATO's reliance on
a first strike with nuclear weapons. In October 1987, Dimitry Yazov argued that










necessary for Soviet forces "to conduct a decisive offense". 126 This caveat
allowed the continued growth and development of offensive capabilities to occur.
Lothar Ruhl disclosed recent evidence supporting this fact based on documents
recovered from command centers in what was once East Germany (GDR). 127
He maintains that Soviet forces stationed in the GDR were conducting operational
maneuvers and maintaining the equipment necessary to support deep offensive
strike against NATO forces. Elaborate doctrine suggested a multi-front operation
that would occur from the Baltic to the Adriatic Seas. There was also evidence
that these exercises continued following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
Gorbachev's announcement in December 1988 of the unilateral decision to
cut 500,000 men and their associated equipment clearly rocked the military
establishment. He made the decision despite a large group of objectors within the
High Command. The sudden retirement of Marshal Akhromeyev was perceived
by many analysts as a clear objection to Gorbachev's decision. It was also
rumored that other in the military leadership had objected to the decision and the
Minister of defense Yazov and Warsaw Pact Commander Kulikov might also be
removed from their posts. 128 However, these were proven otherwise as
126 Van Oudenaren, The Role of Shevardnadze and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in the Making of Soviet Defense and Arms Control Policy, p. 24.
127 Ruhl, L., "Offensive Defense in the Warsaw Pact", Survival, Vol. 33, No. 5,
1991, pp. 442-450.
128 Hauner, M. and Rahr, A., "New Chief of the General Staff Appointed",
Radio Liberty Research, RL 546/88, December 16, 1988, p. 3.
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Akhromeyev assumed a more direct role in his capacity as advisor to the
president and Yazov and Kulikov continued their support for reform.
2. The Military Under Attack
The conclusion of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
with the United States fulfilled many long standing objectives for the Soviet
political leadership. Of greatest importance was the removal of weapons systems
(Pershing II, GLCM's) that could hit targets in the Soviet Union. Another
significant point was the Soviet perception that the treaty was the beginning of
U.S. withdrawal from Europe and a common European security system was closer
to becoming reality. The INF treaty was also seen as a major hurdle towards
improving the USSR's position in the international community.
A significant fallout in civil-military relations also occurred as a result of the
treaty. Because one major action taken by the Party-military phalanx in the
Brezhnev Defense Council had been undone, the frame of reference that had
produced that step became politically vulnerable. Tensions that had existed with
in the Defense Council began to move into the public light with the blessing of
Gorbachev.129 Harsh public criticism by civilian analysts and the press
increased following the treaty signature. A significant attack by Alexander Bovin
in 1987 initiated much of the debate over security issues. He criticized past
defense decision-makers for the deployment of the Soviet SS-20 missiles that were
129 German, H., Gorbachev and the Future of the Soviet Military Institution, p. 25.
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being dismantled in lieu of the treaty provisions emphasizing the enormous
expense that had been wasted.
The future foreign minister, Alexandr Bessmertnykh, lead the assault against
the military decision-makers declaring "a number of decisions have not been
clearly optimal" and that "somewhat different calculations could have been
made...when our security goals were being defined" 130 Shevardnadze joined the
fray by attacking the very foundations of military strategy and doctrine. In a
scathing speech at the July 1988 foreign affairs conference, he criticized the
military's perception of World War II arguing that "the lessons that had been
derived from the war and that predetermined the main strategic, above all
military institution of security, were not being assessed clearly enough in light of
recent experience.. .the war showed that the stockpiles of weapons of the side
subjected to the attack were not of decisive importance for rebuffing
aggression." 131 He went on to put forward an unprecedented demand that
henceforth, "Major innovations in defense development should be verified by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs to determine whether they correspond juridically to
existing international agreements and to stated political positions. 132 He insisted
that "the carelessness in the military sphere, which in the past has been devoid
130 H-p^e Art of Weighing Possibilities", New Times, No. 46, 1987, cited in Van
Oudenaren, J., p. 19.
131 Shevardnadze, Ev "The 19th Ail-Union CPSU Conference: Foreign and




of democratic control can, in the context of acute mistrust and controversial
suspicion, cost the country a great deal.... 133
The attacks on the military began to cover a wider range of issue that had
bedeviled the military leadership. It became readily apparent that the military
was caught in a political cross-fire and began to be used a scape goat for the lack
of economic progress made by perestroika. Caught between the imperatives of
a political leadership determine to reform Soviet Society and the frustrations of
a more and more resistive population, the military was blamed for social ills
ranging from economic stagnation to shortcomings in higher education. Criticism
came from not only from civilians but from reform minded officers with the
military.
The diffusion of international tension facilitated by rapprochement with the
West led to another intense civil-military debate sponsored by Gorbachev. The
debate concern the conscription based system employed by the military to obtain
manpower resources. Gorbachev's encouragement began at a Komsomol rally in
November 1988, as he appealed for reforming the existing system. A few days
later Colonel Alexander Savinkin promoted the idea of a transformation of the
army into a relatively small and mainly volunteer, professional army to be
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radical views by the historical precedent set by Lenin in the 1920's [see Chapter
II] and his efforts to revive the war-torn economy. Savinkin's ideas received a
great deal of support from both civilian and military advocates. One chief
proponent was Major Vladimir Lopatin, a member of the USSR Congress of
People's Deputies. He circulated a draft military reform plan early in 1990 that
called for a smaller, all volunteer, professional army, the virtual elimination of
Party influence, a reduction military spending and afforded greater control to
civilian leadership. An additional part of this proposal addressed the relationship
between the center and the periphery. Lopatin's plan called for greater
republican access to defense decision-making and urged the establishment of
republican armies and territorial service. Lopatin's proposals became extremely
popular among the lower and middle ranks of the officer corp.
There was significant military opposition to Lopatin's plan in the High
Command which included Defense Minister Yazov and Marshal Akhromeyev.
The Defense Ministry promoted their own draft proposal to counter Lopatin. This
program amounted to a streamlining of the existing system. A reduction in
manpower to between 3 - 3.2 million men would be spread out over all five
services. 135 The Defense Ministry also stressed that military capabilities were
to be maintained by the technical re-equipping of the armed forces and by
enhanced training. Principal arguments for maintaining the current mixed
135 Foye, S., "The Soviet High Command and the Politics of Military Reform",
Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 27, July 5, 1991, p. 11.
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professional and conscript force were that it was superior politically, economically
and militarily. Yazov argued
"...Politically the current army is the most democratic system and accords
with the principals of social justice. From the economic perspective, it
ensures the most economical, rational utilization of societies resources
allocated for defense needs. Militarily it is not inferior to a professional
army, and in terms of a number of parameters is actually superior to it. 136
Splits in the High Command over the military reform were publicly exposed
when the Commander in Chief of the Navy, Admiral Chernavin, broke ranks and
advocated (if only implicitly) a professional force offering "real benefits to
seamen".
137 The former Chief of Staff of the defunct Warsaw Pact, Army
General Vladimir Lobov also argued that the country now needed
"a more resolute turn toward the principal of universal voluntary enlistment
for the army service, under which contract service would be offered to all.
The switch to such a system should begin as soon as our economy emerges
from the crisis situation." 138
This argument became the consensus of the High Command and made the
outcome of the debate contingent on the success of Gorbachev's economic returns.
Glasnost within the military opened a pandora's box of other issues that
plagued the military. Charges were made by the public that the military was
136 Arnett R., and Fitzgerald, M., "Is the Soviet Military Leadership Yielding
on an All-Volunteer Army", Report on the USSR, RL 145/90, March 21, 1990, p. 3.
137 Mysyakov, D., "Chistyi farvater", Komsomolskaya pravda, February 21, 1988,
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living in a closed, and privileged world separate and hostile to society. The
officer corps was increasingly seen as exemplifying the old establishment. Public
resentment turned into violence in the non-Russian republics as criminal acts
perpetrated by civilians resulted in several deaths of Soviet officers. In a report
issued by the Committee for Defense and State Security it was reported that the
number of deaths had been increasing since 1987. Eighty five deaths, forty two
of which were the result of premeditated murder occurred in 1989 alone. 139
This figure was up from only two deaths the previous year. Although the
validity of the numbers is suspect, the trend in public hostility toward the
military establishment was not.
Daily reports of corruption, violence, and mistreatment of military personnel
appeared in the press. The harsh practice of hazing, though well known in the
West, was publicly condemned. This public exposure had a demoralizing effect
on the officer corps and servicemen in general. The increased social awareness
promoted inter-ethnic disputes with the military. The number of mutinies and
deserters increased. Nationality and internal order problems began to increase
with the disillusioned society. Of particular significance was the fallout created
by the military's involvement in the Tbilisi massacre. On the night of April 9,
1989, interior and regular army troops brutally suppressed a nationalistic
demonstration in the main square of Tbilisi, in the republic of Georgia. Nineteen
139 Foye, S., "Murders of Soviet Officers", Report on the USSR, Vol. 2, No. 26,
June 21, 1990, p. 11.
78
people died, mostly women, some from being beaten with shovels others from
exposure to toxic gas. 140 A civil-military polemic raged as the parties concerned
raced to pin the blame on the other. Moscow insisted that the order was given
at the local level, while authorities in Georgia maintain that military authorities
in Moscow directed the operation. In the subsequent investigation, the leader of
the Tbilisi operation, Colonel General Igor Rodionov, then commander of the
Transcaucasian military district invoked brutal criticism on the political leadership
for failing to head off events that lead to military involvement. Rodionov was
dismissed from his post as well as Chebikov of the KGB for their involvement.
Rodionov's staunch criticism of the political leadership gained significant support
of the conservative leadership in the military and as a result he was given the
position as head of the prestigious Voroshilov Military Academy of the General
Staff. From this vantage point Rodionov continued his assult on the political
leadership. Specifically he attacked Shevardnadze as an "unprincipled person"
and denounced Gorbachev's foreign policy as a succession of unilateral
concessions. 141
In the aftermath of Tbilisi the military became increasingly wary of internal
intervention. The military's image had been shattered. Centrifugal forces within
the Soviet periphery continued to deteriorate and effect the military's position.
140 Van Oudenaren, J., The Role of Shevardnadze and the Minisry of Foreign
Affairs in the Making of Soviet Defense and Arms Control Policy, p. 49.
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The manpower resources for which the military relied upon to sustain its force
structure became unreliable. The Baltic republics as well as the Transcaucasus
became political powder kegs of nationalistic dissent. They passed laws that
prevented indigenous ethnic groups from serving outside their respective
republics and promoted the avoidance of the draft. In January 1990, the political
vulnerability of the military's manpower system was shown as the efforts by
Yazov to mobilize reserve ethnic Russians to quell a disturbance in Baku resulted
in strong public resistance requiring the effort to be subsequently abandoned.
Further concessions to the republics by Gorbachev continued to alienate military
leaders as he amended the 1967 Draft Law to permit nearly two hundred
thousand college students to defer their service obligations. The result was a
significant loss in combat readiness as replacement officers were no longer
available to support the General Staff's plan for an efficient draw down of
personnel mandated by unilateral cuts already in force. 142
An alarming development began to take root in the military leadership as
a result of their social malaise. They began to rally around a new found ideology
promoted by Karem Rash, a prerviously unknown writer. His ideology was
particularly appealing to the High Command as his ideas served to coalesce a




as a knight in shining armor. 143 He insists the decision to invade Afghanistan
was politically correct and uses a historical backdrop to promote the military as
a new elite to replace the waning Communist Party in the Soviet Union. 144 In
the era of perestroika "the military should feel that they are the backbone and
sacred institution of a thousand years of statehood...At the turning points in
history, the military was to be the main, real hope of the people and frequently
fulfilled assignments that at the first glance seemed inappropriate for them.... 145
Referring to the tension in civil-military relations Rash said "If in the past officers
were prejudice against civilians, it was because it seemed they lacked the
commitment to the glory of the fatherland". 146 The military leadership in the
face of harsh criticism from all sectors of society and in a deteriorating political
system looked upon itself as the only means of promoting unity.
3. The Diplomatic Locomotive
Another significant cause of civil-military tension was the a result of
the collapse of Communist power in Eastern Europe. The events which led to the
collapse of Soviet power and it timing are well known and beyond the scope of
this research. However, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and
143 Tsypkin, M., "Karem Rush: An Ideologue of Military Power", Report on the








the demise of the Warsaw Pact alliance had specific consequences for civil-
military relations. One clear effect on the military was the loss of the extensive
buffer the territory had provided. The vast expenditure in defence resources built
up over nearly half a century, had been lost almost overnight.
Another effect was the resentment and polarization of military opposition
to Gorbachev that followed in its wake. Military opposition grew increasingly
stronger with the demise of Communist power causing Gorbachev to redress his
attitude towards the military. Outspoken conservative military leaders such as
Colonel General Al'bert Makashov, vehemently attacked Gorbachev's foreign and
domestic policies. He asserted "because the so-called victories of our diplomacy,
the Soviet army is being driven without a fight out of countries which our fathers
liberated from fascism."147 He vowed that the Soviet Armed Forces would never
accept "ideological surrender". He charged that domestic reforms had permitted
the "ideological enemy" to divide soldiers from officers, and officers from
generals. 148 An early reaction came from Gorbachev and his supporters. Using
arguments from an economic perspective, Gorbachev retorted the "reasonable
sufficiency" had not degraded the security of the USSR imploring the "Soviet
Union spent up to eighteen percent of its national income to defense.. .a higher
147 Gelman, H., Gorbachev and the Future of the Soviet Military Institution, p. 41.
See also Foye, S., "Military Hardliner Condemns "New Thinking in Security
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proportion than any other country in the world". 149 Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze in specifically defending the foreign policy with respect to the
unification of Germany posed the question "Where lies the greater risk-in
maintaining the division of a great nation that will inevitably strive for
reunification or in unifying it the context of an all European settlement?"150
Shevardnaze also cited that the military had been involved in all stages of the
planning and apologized only for the domestic aspects of the re-deployment of
troops and realized the hardship for military personnel.
As the policies of Gorbachev became more radicalized, he alienated a large
following of military personnel he had specifically hired to support him.
Fractures in the military had produced a debilitated military looking for its "man
on horseback". As the situation in the republics continued to deteriorate
Gorbachev was forced to grant concessions to the military in return for their
support in maintaining the union.
4. The Twenty-eighth Party Congress
The Congress convened on July 2, 1990. It provided a forum for an
intense debate between civilian and military leaders. The focus of the debate
centered on two specific issue with respect to military affairs. The first concerned
the fallout associated Gorbachev's "new thinking" in foreign policy. Harsh
149
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criticism was thrown at the political leadership from the 269 military delegates
that were present. The majority of those represented were drawn from the
conservative High Command. Substantial evidence suggested that the
representatives were manipulated by the High Command to ensure a
predominately conservative group. 151 The assault was led by Major General
Mikulin, head of the Political Administration of the Southern Group of Forces.
He blamed new thinking for the loss of Eastern Europe, rejected Gorbachev's idea
of a "Common European House" and contended that the Vienna conventional
arms control talks would lead to Soviet unilateral disarmament. 152 This criticism
was echoed in the remarks of Admiral Gennadii Khvatov who stated "We have
no allies in the West. ..no allies in the East...and consequently we are back where
we were in 1939. 153 Both Yazov and Moiseev were unwilling to engage the
political leadership in the same harsh tones and were generally supportive of
Gorbachev. The declaration by NATO leaders on July 5, 1990 stating that the
blocs were longer adversaries and calling for joint action with Moscow formed a
platform for Gorbachev supporters to engage military conservatives. Despite
strong arguments by Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and others, the resolution on
military affairs resulted in compromise. It affirmed that there was still a
151
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significant threat to the USSR and the international community was still unstable.
The document called for a strengthening of defense while at the same time
promoting the establishment of a comprehensive system of international
security. 154
The other fundamental issue affecting military affairs was the debate
concerning the military-political organs. Since Gorbachev's attempt to curtail
Communist Party access to state institutions, calls for depoliticizing the armed
forces were increasingly popular. Again a compromise solution was established.
Seen as a victory for the conservatives, the political administration was allowed
to continue their activities but ceased to be an arm of the Communist Party. Its
role was slightly redressed as their function was to conduct educational, cultural,
and administrative work independent of the Party. Gorbachev was in no hurry
to facilitate the complete removal of the Parties influence as it was seen as a
"source of stability". 155
D. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DETERIORATING UNION
1. Further Institutional Reform
Gorbachev found himself confronted with economic morass and a
crumbling empire. He continued to grapple with the collective leadership of the






perestroika. The Politburo remained the nerve center of Soviet power and its
conservative wing was able to block the implementation of radical reforms. In
an attempt to overcome the paralysis of power created by Communist Party
influence and to shore up a stable position safe from opposition, Gorbachev
established the post of President. He was sworn in on March 15, 1990 by the
Congress of People's Deputies.
Civil-military relations continued to evolve under the direction of the new
President. Gorbachev's enhanced power allowed further changes to be made to
the defense decision-making bodies that would function under the his direction.
Gorbachev hinted at major changes to the Defense Council as early as autumn of
1989. The proposed changes to the council's structure were revealed as a
constitutional amendment in February 1990. It provided that the President would
be "Supreme commander of the Soviet armed forces and chairman of the USSR
Security and Defense Council"156 The title of the Council reflected an interest by
Gorbachev supporter to expand the previous Defense Council's role to include
internal security as well. An important result of this enlarged role is that the
secretariat of the council would also be expanded beyond the exclusive purview
of the General Staff. Essentially, the secretariat would emulate the staff of the
U.S. National Security Council and thereby reduce the Soviet military leadership's
control of the agenda. By March 1990, all references to the Defense Council were
156 Gelman, H., Gorbachev and the Evolving Soviet System for National Security
Decisionmaking, RAND Corporation (WD-5554-A), August 1991, p. 55.
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deleted from the amendments proposed to the Congress. This suggested that the
changes were being subjected to a great deal of behind the scenes debate. The
revised amendment approved by the Congress, established a new Presidential
Council. The Councils function was "to advise the president on foreign, domestic,
and ensure the countries security." 157 Members of the Council were personally
selected and approved by the President without consenting parliamentary
approval. It was speculated that the Presidential Council replaced the Defense
Council. 158 Initially Gorbachev and the chief of the General Staff both made
statements to this effect. In an interview with the press following the Congress,
Moiseev indicated that "it was his understanding that the Defense Council had
indeed been abolished and complained that neither he nor any other military
representative had been allowed to attend the Congress." 159
It quickly became clear that the composition of the Presidential Council was
unfit to replace the Defense Councils function as the membership did not include
Lev Zaykov or Moiseev. In mid April Gorbachev announced that the Defense
Council was still a viable working group. However, the Defense Council that
prevailed was noticeably different from its predecessor. A General Staff official,
Major General G. V. Zhivitor, noted that although many of the same positions
157
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remained the commanders of the armed services had been removed. 160
Considerable doubt and confusion continued to exist between political and
military leaders as to the intentions of Gorbachev's institutional reforms.
Eventually in mid-August Gorbachev dispelled doubts as to the Defense Council
viability asserting that
An overhauled Defense Council had been set up and attached to the
Presidential Council and the President.. .It would consider all issue affecting
military activity and the construction of the armed forces. 161
The Defense Council's existence was vividly recognized in August when for the
first time in the history of the organization, the agenda of the council was publicly
reported.
Gorbachev continued to further complicate the decision-making process
when it was announced that the presidential council was being replaced with a
Security Council in December 1990. The creation of the new Council was born
out of the deteriorating situation between the center (Moscow) and the republics.
It was a reflection of Gorbachev's desire to invent a mechanism that would give
him direct personal control of the interwoven political, economic and coercive
measures to deal with a crisis. 162
160 Kommunist Voorozhonykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces), p. 27, No.
11, June 1990, signed to press May 31, 1990, cited in footnote 154.






As the centrifugal forces of the republics began to pull apart the union
Gorbachev's rhetoric and attitude began to move to the right. He realized that
the army he had spent five years alienating was now the "bulwark" that would
keep the union together. At the CPSU plenum in February 1990, Gorbachev tried
to sound more accommodating to the military leadership by praising their efforts
in the Caucuses and defending their position in society. He criticized the anti-
military sentiments calling for a more respectful attitude towards the military.
The chief of the General Staff criticized Gorbachev's commentary. He argued that
Gorbachev failed to propose any specific measures to deal with the momentous
problems currently overtaking the Soviet Union. Moiseev added that Gorbachev's
comments failed to reflect the contribution made by the armed forces to Soviet
national security and even belittled their role in a attempt to isolate the military
from the people.
Gorbachev continued to placate the military leadership through numerous
concessions. The most notable concessions were the promotion of Defense
Minister Yazov to the rank of Marshal and the permission to hold military
parades after years of denial. He also increased the benefits and salaries of
servicemen. Several compromises were also made towards ongoing arms control
negotiations with the United States that indicated military resistance. There was
some momentary stiffening if not regressing on the START treaty negotiations.
More significant was that during the spring and summer of 1990, Gorbachev held
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up troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe and delayed the conclusion of the
Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty. The General Staff also prevailed over
Shevardnadze and the civilian leadership following the conclusion of the CFE
treaty in November 1990. They enticed Gorbachev into agreeing to a
reinterpretation of the Soviet force structure in Europe that redefined three
motorized rifle divisions as coastal defense forces, thus exempting their weaponry
from the Treaty reductions. This episode clearly demonstrated a decline in the
ability of the civilian leadership's ability to override military desires.
Gorbachev also delayed reprisals against outspoken military personnel and
radical groups such as Soyuz (Union) which were consistently calling for his
resignation and hard-line positions toward the republics. He made appointments
that were suggestive of his intent to crackdown on the internal turmoil. Colonel
General Boris Gromov was appointed first deputy Minister of the Interior in
December 1990. Gromov was known for his conservatism and routine attacks on
civilian critics of the military. He deplored the overly benign view of Western
intentions promoted by pro-reformists. His promotion was seen as part of an
ominous shift in emphasis from the use of the military against external enemies
to use against internal ones. The appointment of KGB Major General Boris Pugo
to the post of Internal Affairs Ministry was also reflective of this trend.
Gorbachev's patience with the republics had worn thin towards the latter
part of 1990. Defense Minister Yazov had also had a change of heart as he had
became a more outspoken critic of new thinking and was disillusioned by the
90
problems created by the independence minded republics. The inability to
administer conscription; the emergence of irregular military formations outside
central control; the increasing incidence of mutiny; a rising total of deserters and
widespread seepage of arms from military stocks had a serious effect on the
combat readiness of the military. The leadership's change in attitude toward
using harsher means of control can be used to explain the events in February and
September of 1990 that led to the speculation of a probable military putsch. On
both occasions, troop movements around Moscow had prompted the alarm.
Stephen Covington maintains that the troops were moved on Gorbachev's orders
at the KGB chairman Kryuchov's recommendation.163 Kryuchov had painted
an alarmist's view about counter-revolutionary forces in Moscow that would
attempt to overthrow the regime.
Gorbachev put his enhanced presidential powers to work as he tried to
intimidate the republics. He made a series of decrees that authorized the armed
forces to protect Communist Party property, to enforce conscription and to reply
with force to any conduct they regarded threatening to themselves and their
installations. Defense Minister Yazov issue a statement on Soviet television that
stated that the armed forces had been ordered to protect military installations and
Covington, S., "Soviet Perspectives on the Current Dynamics of
Perestroika", (Soviet Military Studies Office of SHAPE), January 12, 1991, in
Gelman, H., Gorbachev and the Future of the Soviet Military Institution, p. 54.
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personnel in areas racked by ethnic strife. 164 Yazov condemned "illegal actions"
in a number of republics that were "undermining national security". These
developments brought about the stunning resignation of Shevardnadze on
December 20, 1990. Shevardnadze aim, as he stated in his resignation speech, was
to jolt Soviet democrats out of their apathy and stand up to the reactionary forces
bent on the return of a dictatorship. 165 On December 29, 1990 the Minister of
Defense and Interior announced a directive that called for regular army units to
join police and internal troops in conducting joint patrols ostensibly aimed at
maintaining order. The directive was legalized by Gorbachev a month later
created a contentious debate. On January 7, 1991, President Gorbachev ordered
Soviet airborne troops into the three Baltic republics, Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia,
and some regions of the Ukraine to enforce conscription regulations. The order
precipitated further events that would embarrassed the military leadership and
bring international scrutiny to Gorbachev's new agenda.
3. Towards a New Union
Following the events in the Baltic republics, it became increasingly
evident that despite the Twenty-eight Party Congress and its call for the
disengagement of the Communist Party from the military establishment, the Party
164
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still had a wide following in the military. The unholy alliance between army and
party served as a foundation for conservative resistance to reform. The officer
corps was still overwhelmingly dominated by the Party (seventy percent of the
officer corps and ninety percent of the high command). Promotions still
continued to be skewed by political criteria and the cooperation between the
armies political organs and its party organizations continued. The collusion
between local party organizations and the military was plainly seen in the assault
on the television building in Vilnius, Lithuania on January 13, 1991. The city's
garrison commander claimed to have acted on the orders of a local "national
salvation committee", which appeared to be a front for Pro-Moscow Communists
and other conservative groups. In an attempt to make the linkages between the
Party and military illegal, the USSR Committee for Constitutional Compliance,
ruled that article forty-eight and article twenty of the armed forces regulation be
suspended. 166 Gorbachev's half measures and flirtation with conservatives
allowed the Communist Party to become a rallying point for the military. At the
all Army Party Conference in March 1991, it was evident that the military was
continuing its hard-line against further reform. Yazov blamed "new thinking" for
166
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the problems that existed in the military and argued for uniformed Communists
to take vigorous action to fight these trends. According to Yazov
"under these conditions the vanguard role and moral and political authority
of the Party, the successful conduct of perestroika in all sphere of society -
including defense, depends to a large extent on the rallying ability of the
armed forces one million-strong Party organization.167
The military reform program promoted by the Defense Ministry continued
to endure support among the High Command over Lopatin's agenda. Little was
changed to the program despite the ramifications of the Gulf War and the final
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. A fundamental change was achieved with
respect to center-periphery relations. Moves toward negotiating a modus
operandi between the Union government and the republics was spearheaded by
Moiseev and the General Staff. 168 One of Moiseev's deputies, General
Konstantin Kobets, was appointed a head of the RSFSR state committee
responsible for defense. This was accomplished despite the strong objections of
military hard-liners including Yazov and the chief of the MPA.
Gorbachev's rapprochement with the leaders of nine of the Union's republics
and the election of Boris Yeltsin as President of the RSFSR acted as a catalyst for
further conflict between Gorbachev and conservatives including Yazov. The High
Command continued its strong appeal for a unified, multinational army under a
167 Foye, S., "Rhetoric from the Past: The First All-Army Party Conference",
Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 18, 1991, p. 7.
168 Foye, S., "The Soviet High Command and the Politics of Military Reform",
Vol. 3, No. 27, July 27, 1991, p. 11.
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unified command which put them at odds with the Gorbachev camp and a large
sector of lower ranking officers and servicemen. The draft Union treaty, which
was an attempt by Gorbachev to hold the union together by delegating additional
powers to the republics, was not popular with military conservatives. The draft
treaty contradicted the military's interests by calling for republican participation
in, among other things "defining the military policy of the Union" and "national
security strategy", "resolving questions connected with troop activities and the
locating of military facilities on republican territories," and "directing defense
complex enterprises."169 The conservatives of the High Command also suffered
a huge set back as a result of Boris Yeltsin's election. Led by the military-political
leadership, a significant campaign was mounted to rally military members to vote
against Yeltsin. The results only served to illustrate the fractures in the military
leadership, as Yeltsin had won considerable support in many military district. It
was reported that he won eighty-one percent of the vote in the Pacific and Indian
Ocean Fleets. 170 It has been speculated that these developments led to the much
publicized "right-wing coup" led by Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov in the USSR
Supreme Soviet on June 17, 1991. 171 The so-called "coup" or "insurrection" by
Pavlov had received an emotional following by not only the Defense Minister by
169
170
Krasnaya zvezda, May 1, 1991, pp. 1-2, cited in footnote 164.
The Guardian, June 15, 1991, cited in Foye, S., Gorbachev's Return to
Reform: What Does it Mean for the Armed Forces", Report on the USSR, Vol. 3,




also the KGB chairman and the Minister of the Interior. Pavlov's bid to enhance
his powers over Gorbachev were quickly thwarted.
The Summer of 1991 saw Gorbachev jockeying for position among reformers
and conservatives. There was intense pressure on Gorbachev and the future
success of his reforms leading up to the Group of Seven summit. 172 It was
Gorbachev's intent to appeal for further foreign investment in the Soviet Union's
economic reforms. However, the growing international concern over Gorbachev
position with respect to the republics had created a great deal of wariness on the
part of some of the Group of Seven. It was therefore necessary for Gorbachev to
demonstrate his control over military and political conservatives. This was done
in a series of harsh statements to put the military in its place. On June 21, he
called for new defense cuts and rejected complaints made by the Defense Minister
during the insurrection. On June 22, the fiftieth anniversary of the German
invasion during World War II, Gorbachev sought to further eviscerate the
Communist Party's role in the military. The historiography of the war had often
been a political battlefield in the civil-military debate under Gorbachev. While
conservative forces of the High Command argued of the importance the
Communist Party had played during the war, Gorbachev made no mention of it
172 The Group of Seven consisted of the leaders from the United States, Great
Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, and Japan.
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during his anniversary speech. 173 He also issued a decree that gave the Defense
Minister and the chairman of the KGB one month to make a proposal to
significantly alter the role of military councils. 174 Gorbachev's decree stated that
the military council would be subordinated to Soviet Law and represented an
effort to replace Party control at the local level with democratic government
175
organs.
4. The August 1991 Coup d'etat
Shortly after six in the morning (Moscow time) on August 19, 1991,
TASS and Radio Moscow announced that the USSR President was "prevented by
ill health" from executing his duties and that in accordance with article 127 (7) of
the USSR Constitution, USSR Vice President Gennagii Yanaev was assuming
power as acting president head of an eight-man "State Committee for the State of
Emergency in the USSR". 176 The coup, although cosponsored by Defense
Minister Yazov did not specifically represent the interests of the military but the
Foye, S., "Gorbachev's Return to Reform: What Does it Mean for the
Armed Forces", Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No, 28, July 12, 1991, p. 6.
174 According to Ellen Jones the military council had the right to examine and
decide all important questions of the life and activities of the army and the fleet,
and are responsible before the Central Committee, government, and the Ministry
of Defense for the condition and combat readiness of the troops. Jones, E., Red
Army and Society-A Sociology of the Soviet Military, Boston, 1985, pp. 19-20.
175 Foye, S., "Gorbachev's Return to Reform", p. 7.
176 TASS, August 19, 1991, cited in Teague, E., "Coup d'etat Represented
Naked Interests", Report on the USSR, Vol 3, No. 35, 1991, p. 1.
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naked interests of the military industrial complex - a network of interests
represented by the armed forces and the defense ministry and traditionally
defended by the state police. 177 The effort did not receive a wide following in
the lower echelons f the military command. As Stephen Foye states the coup
could properly be "Characterized as a military coup lacking the support of the
army, launched, implicitly at least, in defense of the Communist Party apparatus
that, in the end refused to support its actions". 178
The immediate causes for the coup have been widely speculated on. One
of the major causes was the friction between conservatives and Gorbachev over
the path of reform. Gorbachev had alienated the Communist Party and the
military in his attempts to overhaul the economy. The "Nine Plus One"
agreement of April 1991 and the impending Union Treaty, which was to be sign
August 20th, would have significantly reduced the power of the center. The
Committee of Eight, seriously miscalculated the progress that Gorbachev's
democratic reforms had brought to society. Defense Minister Yazov and other
participants of the High Command failed to realize the lack of support among the
lower ranking officer. This lead to resistance and open disobedience to orders
issued by the coup plotters and the subsequent failure of the coup.
177
Ibid.
178 Foye, S., "A Lesson in Ineptitude: Military Backed Coup Crumbles", Report
on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 35, August 30, 1991, p. 5.
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Gorbachev also had failed to heed several warning signs from the military
in the months that preceded the coup. On July 23, 1991, an article entitled "A
Word to the People" on the front page of the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya, a
hard-line newspaper of Soviet politics, severely criticized Gorbachev leadership
abilities. It appealed primarily to Russians and secondarily to the Soviet people
to rise up in defiance of the current government of the state and to "resist those
who do not love the country". 179 The article, which was signed by two military
officers: Army General Vaennikov, chief of the ground forces, and Colonel
General Gromov, included an appeal to the armed forces to prepare to be the
means by which the homeland would be preserve intact. "We are convinced that
the men of the army and navy, faithful to their sacred duty, will not allow a
fratricidal war or destruction of the fatherland, that they will step forth as the
dependable guarantors of security as the bulwark of all heathy forces in
society.180 Other members of the military High Command also participated in
clandestine means to shore up support for the future assault on the leadership.
Gorbachev's blind faith in tenants of his own ideology made him believe that the
conservative leadership would not dare encroach on his leadership post.
179 McMichael, S. R., "Moscow Prelude: Warning Signs Ignored", Report on the





The military's participation in the failed coup represented the isolated
interests of the old Party line and the several members of the High Command.
It had been widely recognized by Soviet analysts that there had never been an
attempt at a military coup throughout Soviet history prior to August. It was
thought that the means and extent of control exerted by the Communist Party
made it impossible for such an attempt to occur. The Party and military were
thought to be inseparable and had overlapping interests and objectives. The
military and political reforms initiated under Gorbachev, sought to break this
linkage in order to provide the impetus for economic recovery. He radically
altered the process and institutions of Soviet government to streamline its
dilapidated system of rule. It was during this process that he alienated the very
pillar of legitimacy that kept the Soviet regime in power for over seven decades,
the Soviet military.
Throughout the history of the Soviet Union and the Russian empire, the
military maintained its distinct role within society. Since Imperial Russian times,
the military has sought to protect its institutional interests. It was often consulted
for its expertise in military strategy and doctrine. Bargaining for increases in
budget allocations, military hardware, and manpower, constituted a large part
of the civil-military relationship. The relationship between the political and
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military leadership was one of mutual dependency. Soviet military power and
intimidation gave the regime legitimacy while in return, the political leadership
provided the necessary means and ideology to support the military.
From the beginning the Soviet military held a special place in the regime.
Born out of revolution, the military had defended the fledgling Communist Party
from collapse against external enemies. It was seen as the protector of the Union
and a unifying force for the large, expansive multinational empire. The military
was the key to success in the international class struggle that brought world
recognition to the Soviet regime. It also was a coercive political force that could
consolidate a leaders position in a government that had no definitive leadership
succession mechanism.
Civil-military relations in the Soviet Union were very much a product of an
individual's personal leadership style and background. Every one of the Soviet
leaders prior to Gorbachev had some affiliation with the military, be it through
war or revolution. Gorbachev was illustrative of a new dynamic and charismatic
leadership style that down played the great reliance on military power. He
fundamentally changed the scope of civil-military relations. His methods of
controlling the military were by means of dividing and conquering its leadership.
He moved quickly to eliminate conservative forces of the old regime.
The autonomous position occupied by the military under Brezhnev came
under close scrutiny. Military privilege in the economy and their unquestioned
authority in military affairs had lead to economic stagnation, a militant society,
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and corruption and mismanagement in the armed forces. Gorbachev's "new
thinking" and perestroika provided the impetus for all of the radical reforms
bestowed on society. The military's role in international affairs was devalued,
nuclear weapons no longer provided political leverage, and the "human factor"
in politics took on greater importance. The Soviet Union's reliance on military
power had brought it isolation in the international community, involved in
foreign wars, and produced a world that could destroy itself several thousand
times. Gorbachev's ideology brought enhanced civilian access to military
decision-making bodies. Glasnost provided the civilian leadership greater access
to military secrets. Academics, intellectuals and the press forced the military
leadership to legitimize their role in society. Heated debates over the extent and
path of military reform ensued between the political and military leadership. No
issue concerning the military was afforded sanctity. The military was perceived
as the one of the primary means for which economic recovery. Military reform
took on many dimensions. The major issues concerned the size of armed forces
that would be sufficient to defend the Soviet Union, and the appropriate doctrine
to visibly deter aggression but not appear offensive. Arms control and
disarmament became the key instruments of Soviet foreign policy. It provided
a forum for an intense civil-military struggle. Military resistance to unilateral
concessions sustain numerous debates as the civilians pushed for further
reductions. Civilian logic had it that as the stockpiles of weapons, both
conventional and nuclear, went down, international tension would recede and
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allow further cuts in Soviet forces. Technological resources would funnel into the
crumbling Soviet economy as a result of reduced tension and give it renewed
vigor. The INF, CFE, START, and unilateral reductions of Soviet forces had the
military in retreat and the civilian leadership dominating the reform process.
Gorbachev's miscalculations in foreign policy lead to the collapse of
Communist power in Eastern Europe and the unification of the two German
states. His antagonistic attitude toward the military produced severe breaches in
the civil-military relationship. The High Command was forced to accommodate
a large scale demobilization of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe as well as the Far
East, and Afghanistan on a short time scale which produced intense pressure and
frustration for the military leadership. Military participation in politics increased
as the break away republics sought to rid themselves of the central controls.
Every dimension of politics and society began to involve the military leadership
at some stage. Faced with an extreme housing shortage and poor living
conditions, the military leadership began to fracture. Anti-militarism in the
republics produced the perception of the Soviet military as an occupying force.
A disgruntled officer corp saw the combat readiness of their units rapidly
deteriorate as inter-ethnic disputes, desertions and open hostility raged within the
military establishment. Support for the High Command became increasingly
disillusioned by their unwillingness to provide organizational reforms that would
rectify the rapidly deteriorating situation.
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Gorbachev's vacillating political position generated widespread criticism
from the military. As he began to disengage the Communist Party from all levels
of Soviet government, Gorbachev crippled the last means for controlling the
military. Conservative leaders began subverting his reforms and forestalling his
efforts at further reform. Civil-military relations rapidly deteriorated as the
disintegration of the Union became imminent. The military saw their autonomy
in military affairs usurped, their professional interests sacrificed and their
privileged position demoted. Fearing the loss of a large, unified, multinational
army, the fractured High Command endorsed the coup d'etat. Their
miscalculation as to the support it would bring led to the coups failure.
The consequences of the failed coup will provide the impetus for further
radical reform of the existing military organization. In all possibility greater
civilian access to defence decision-making will provide the necessary controls over
the military leadership. However, the likelihood of continued resistance by
former members of the defunct Communist Party and the military is a distinct
possibility. Militarism has always been a force in the region and will continue to
provide a medium for a possible "man on horseback" to lead the former union
republics out of their economic morass. The debate over the future structure of
the military will continue to provide both conflict and consensus. The
consequences of the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will
press the future republican leadership's to enhance the civil-military dialogue and
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